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Common Allegations
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•
•
•
•
•

Failure to leverage bargaining power
Expensive and underperforming investment options
Recordkeeping fees
Inclusion of proprietary investments
Too many investment options
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Failure to Leverage Bargaining Power
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• Basis of the claim: The plans failed to use their bargaining power to reduce costs to
participants by including retail class shares as opposed to institutional class shares
• Claim rejected: Penn, NYU, Columbia, Duke, Princeton, Vanderbilt, Johns Hopkins,
Chicago
• Claim proceeding: Emory, MIT, Princeton, Cornell
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Expensive and Underperforming Investment Options
Brossman: Employee Retirement Plans and Alleged Breaches of Fiduciary Oblig

• Basis of the claim: The plans selected and retained expensive and underperforming
investment options
• Claim rejected: Penn
• Claim proceeding: NYU, Columbia, Cornell, MIT, Emory, Chicago, Johns Hopkins,
Princeton, Duke
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Recordkeeping Fees
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• Basis of the claim: The plans incurred duplicative fees from using more than one
record-keeper
• Claim rejected: Penn
• Claim proceeding: Emory, NYU, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Princeton
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Inclusion of Proprietary Investments
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•

Basis of the claim: The plans breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to contracts
with service providers that required the inclusion of proprietary investment options

•

Claim rejected: Penn, NYU, Columbia, MIT, Vanderbilt, Cornell

•

Claim proceeding: Emory, Duke
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Too Many Investment Options
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•

Having hundreds of investment options causes participant confusion and inaction

•

Claim rejected: Penn, Johns Hopkins, Cornell, NYU, Columbia, MIT, Emory, Vanderbilt

•

Claim proceeding: Duke
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Sweda v. The University of Pennsylvania

Brossman: Employee Retirement Plans and Alleged Breaches of Fiduciary Oblig

• First of these cases to be dismissed in full
• Participants asserted breach of fiduciary duties arising out of plan fiduciaries'
decisions to:
– Lock the plan into certain TIAA-CREF accounts
– Allow TIAA-CREF and Vanguard to serve as their own recordkeepers and use asset-based
recordkeeping instead of flat, per person fees
– Offering some retail class shares
– Permitting some underperforming funds to remain in the plan

• E.D. Pa. dismissed all claims, citing Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011),
which holds that courts should consider the composition of the plan's offerings as a
whole, rather than singling out individual underperforming funds
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Disclaimer
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Timed Agenda: Mark Brossman, Partner, Schulte Roth and Zabel LLP
Introduction and Background (5 min total)


Quick overview of 403(b)



Development of regulatory scheme



Same plaintiff’s law firm



Same type of defendants

Common Allegations (10 min total)


Failure to Leverage Bargaining Power (2 min)



Expensive and Underperforming Investment Options (2 min)



Record Keeping Fees (2 min)



Inclusion of Proprietary Investments (2 min)



Too Many Investment Options (2 min)

Sweda v. University of Pennsylvania (5 min)

Outline of Proposed Class Actions Against University Retirement Plans
Mark Brossman, Partner, Schulte Roth and Zabel LLP


Proposed class actions filed against the following universities: Emory University, Duke
University, University of Pennsylvania, Columbia University, Cornell University, Johns
Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University,
Northwestern University, Vanderbilt University, Princeton University, University of
Southern California, Yale University, Georgetown University, Washington University in
Saint Louis, Brown University, and the University of Chicago.
o Plaintiffs filed a second complaint against the retirement plans maintained by
NYU Langone Hospitals and NYU Langone Health Systems



Common Allegations: (i) the plans failed to use their bargaining power to reduce costs to
participants by including retail class shares as opposed to institutional class shares
(“Failure to Leverage Bargaining Power”); (ii) the plans selected and retained expensive
and underperforming investment options (“Underperforming Investment Options”); (iii)
the plans incurred duplicative fees from using more than one record-keeper
(“Recordkeeping Fees”); (iv) the plans breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to
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contracts with service providers that required the inclusion of proprietary investment
options (“Inclusion of Proprietary Investments”); (v) the plans offered participants too
many investment options.
o Failure to Leverage Bargaining Power (claim rejected): Penn, NYU, Columbia,
Duke, Princeton, Vanderbilt, Johns Hopkins, Chicago


Institutional class shares (which are generally only available to larger
institutions with more bargaining power) were included as plan options
(37 out of 78 in Penn case). Further, institutional class shares are only
available if significantly more money was funneled into each them.
“Switching from retail to institutional shares is not a matter of checking a
different box. It requires fiduciaries to balance the menu of options given
to plan beneficiaries against the fees.” Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 2017 BL
334297, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017). Case law in the Third, Seventh
and Ninth circuit holds that including higher cost-share classes instead of
identified available low-cost share classes does not constitute imprudence.
“[P]rudent fiduciaries may very well choose to offer retail class shares
over institutional class shares (presumably even where, as here, both
versions have identical portfolio managers, underlying investments, and
asset allocation, because retail class shares necessarily offer higher
liquidity than institutional investment vehicles.” Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ.,
2017 BL 29949, at *14 (Aug. 25, 2017).

o Failure to Leverage Bargaining Power (claim proceeding): Emory, MIT,
Princeton, Cornell


Plaintiffs state a plausible claim for breach of the duty of prudence where
allegations state that the plan did not use its bargaining power to obtain
lower cost fees and that the lower cost shares are the exact same as the
higher cost shares except for the actual fees charged plausibly states a
claim for breach of the duty of prudence. In the Cornell case, the court
will allow this allegation to proceed to the extent that plaintiffs can allege
that the plan sponsor selected specific retail funds over lower-cost, but
otherwise identical institutional.

o Underperforming Investment Options (claim rejected): Penn


There is no cause of action in ERISA for “underperforming funds.” The
fact that only 7 more funds underperformed than would be expected may
be consistent with a breach of fiduciary duty, but it does not show that the
plaintiffs “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

o Underperforming Investment Options (claim proceeding): NYU, Columbia,
Cornell, MIT, Emory, Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Duke
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Plaintiffs alleged that particular funds underperformed relative to
comparable lower-cost alternatives over the preceding one-, five-, and tenyear periods. Had the plans’ fiduciaries prudently monitored and
evaluated such investment options, they would have removed them.

o Recordkeeping Fees (claim rejected): Penn


In Penn, the plan includes two recordkeepers; Vanguard and TIAA-CREF
each serve as the recordkeeper for their respective offerings. The
plaintiffs alleged that the plan allowed Vanguard and TIAA-CREF to
charge unreasonable fees by allowing them to operate as their own
recordkeepers (rather than consolidating all funds with a single third-party
recordkeeper). The court dismissed this allegation because the “bundling
of services is not inconsistent with lawful, free market behavior in the best
interests…of [the] beneficiaries.” Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 2017 BL
334297, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017). The court found “rational
bundling reasons” to allow separate recordkeepers (i.e., Vanguard’s
requirement that they serve as recordkeeper to gain access to the desired
Vanguard portfolio). Id.

o Recordkeeping Fees (claim proceeding): Emory, NYU, Columbia, Johns
Hopkins, Princeton


Plaintiffs’ allegation that a prudent fiduciary would have chosen one
recordkeeper instead of multiple recordkeepers was sufficient to state a
claim for relief because this “inefficient and costly structure caused Plan
participants to pay excessive and unreasonable fees…[and] similarly-sized
plans have a single recordkeeper instead of multiple recordkeepers, which
helps keep costs lower.” Henderson v. Emory Univ., 2017 BL 158874, at
*6 (N.D. Ga. May 10, 2017). The court in the NYU case noted that while
having a single recordkeeper is not required as a matter of law, the
plaintiffs alleged facts (i.e., NYU consolidated recordkeeping for one
retirement plan, but not its other retirement plan) supporting the
proposition that a prudent fiduciary would have chosen fewer
recordkeepers and thus reduced costs to plan participants.

o Inclusion of Proprietary Investments (claim rejected): Penn, NYU, Columbia,
MIT, Vanderbilt, Cornell


The plan’s contractual agreement with a service provider requiring it to
place certain investment options in the plan did not, on its own,
demonstrate imprudence because the plaintiffs made no allegations that
the plan sponsor was unable to terminate such agreement if they believed
that to be a prudent action.

o Inclusion of Proprietary Investments (claim proceeding): Emory, Duke
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Plaintiffs alleged that the plans’ fiduciaries commited the plans to an
imprudent arrangement in which certain investments had to be included
and could not be removed from the plan even when they were no longer
prudent investments and prevented the plans from using alternatives
recordkeepers who could provide services at a lower costs. The courts
agreed that these allegations sufficiently stated a claim for relief because
the plans’ fiduciaries had no process to remove these accounts and failed
to monitor and remove these imprudent investments.

o Too Many Investment Options (claim rejected): Penn, Johns Hopkins, Cornell,
NYU, Columbia, MIT, Emory, Vanderbilt


Having too many investment options does not hurt the plans’ participants,
but instead provides them opportunities to choose the investments they
prefer.

o Too Many Investment Options (claim proceeding): Duke


No reason provided. In the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, plaintiffs
alleged that the plan’s over 400 investment options caused participant
confusion and inaction.



Only the suit against the University of Pennsylvania was dismissed in full (currently on
appeal in the Third Circuit).



Most courts found that these common allegations violate ERISA’s duty of prudence and
not ERISA’s duty of loyalty. In each lawsuit, plaintiffs also brought a claim under
Section 406 of ERISA. Only the court in the Duke case allowed such a claim to proceed.
In Duke, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, by using the plan’s four recordkeepers,
caused the plan to engage in transactions that the defendants knew or should have known
constituted an exchange of property between the plan and the four recordkeepers. These
transactions occurred each time the plan paid fees to TIAA-CREF, Fidelity, VALIC, and
Vanguard and in connection with the plan’s investments in funds that paid revenue
sharing to TIAA-CREF, Fidelity, VALIC, and Vanguard.



In the suits against Yale and Northwestern, the courts have not yet ruled on each
university’s motion to dismiss.



In the USC case, in lieu of a motion to dismiss, USC moved to compel arbitration and the
court denied USC’s motion to compel arbitration. The university appealed the issue of
whether arbitration clauses in employment agreements extend to ERISA claims — an
issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. The case has not been stayed pending
appeal.



Motions to certify class have been filed in the MIT, Duke cases
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The NYU case is set to proceed to trial in April. The Vanderbilt case is set to proceed to
trial in November 2019.



The UPenn case was dismissed in its entirety by the district court. It has been appealed to
the Third Circuit. The Princeton case has been stayed pending the outcome of the UPenn
case.



The Columbia case has settled.



The Chicago case is currently in mediation.



Motions to dismiss have been filed in the Brown and Washington University cases.
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*

Pagination
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Majority Opinion >
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DAVID CLARK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DUKE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
1:16-CV-1044
May 11, 2017, Filed May 11, 2017, Decided

For DAVID CLARK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF PARTICIPANTS AND
BENEFICIARIES ON BEHALF OF THE DUKE FACULTY AND STAFF RETIREMENT PLAN, KEITH A FEATHER,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES ON
BEHALF OF THE DUKE FACULTY AND STAFF RETIREMENT PLAN, JORGE LOPEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES ON BEHALF OF THE DUKE
FACULTY AND STAFF RETIREMENT PLAN, THOMAS C MEHEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE
OF A CLASS OF PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES ON BEHALF OF THE DUKE FACULTY AND STAFF
RETIREMENT PLAN, SUSIE PETTUS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF
PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES ON BEHALF OF THE DUKE FACULTY AND STAFF RETIREMENT PLAN,
ROBERT HEALY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS OF PARTICIPANTS AND
BENEFICIARIES ON BEHALF OF THE DUKE FACULTY AND STAFF RETIREMENT PLAN, Plaintiffs: JEROME J.
SCHLICHTER, LEAD ATTORNEY, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, ST. LOUIS, MO; ETHAN D. HATCH,
SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, ST. LOUIS, MO; HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON,
ST. LOUIS, MO; KURT C. STRUCKHOFF, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, ST. LOUIS, MO; MICHAEL A.
WOLFF, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, ST. LOUIS, MO; SEAN E. SOYARS, SCHLICHTER BOGARD &
DENTON, ST. LOUIS, MO; TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, ST. LOUIS, MO; DAVID B.
PURYEAR, JR., PURYEAR AND LINGLE, P.L.L.C., GREENSBORO, NC.
For KATHI LUCAS, Plaintiff: HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, ST. LOUIS, MO; TROY A.
DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, ST. LOUIS, MO; JEROME J. SCHLICHTER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD
& DENTON, ST. LOUIS, MO.
For DUKE UNIVERSITY, DUKE INVESTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, KYLE CAVANAUGH, TIM WALSH, JAMES
S. ROBERTS, KENNETH C. MORRIS, RHONDA BRANDON, NEAL TRIPLETT, Steve Smith, Defendants: JEREMY
P. BLUMENFELD, LEAD ATTORNEY, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, PHILADELPHIA, PA; STACY K. WOOD,
LEAD ATTORNEY, PARKER POE ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, CHARLOTTE, NC; ABBEY M. GLENN, MORGAN LEWIS
& BOCKIUS, LLP, WASHINGTON, DC; CHRISTOPHER A. WEALS, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP,
WASHINGTON, DC; DONALD L. HAVERMANN, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, WASHINGTON, DC.

Catherine C. Eagles, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
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Catherine C. Eagles

ORDER
The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint. As pled, the first and second causes of action are
barred by the statute of limitations and the sixth and eighth causes of action have insufficient facts alleged to make
them plausible. The third, fourth, and fifth causes of action state a claim. The defendant has insufficiently explained
why the seventh cause of action should be dismissed.
The plaintiffs assert in their first cause of action that "[d]efendants were required to independently assess 'the
prudence of each investment option' for the Plan on an ongoing basis, and to act prudently and solely in the interest of
the Plan's participants in deciding whether to maintain a recordkeeping arrangement. [*2] Defendants were also
required to remove investments that were no longer prudent for the Plan." Doc. 24 at ¶ 226 (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original). They then allege that defendants breached these fiduciary duties as follows:
By allowing TIAA-CREF to mandate the inclusion of the CREF Stock Account and Money Market Account
in the Plan, as well as the TIAA Traditional Annuity, and to require that it provide recordkeeping for its
proprietary options, Defendants committed the Plan to an imprudent arrangement in which certain
investments had to be included and could not be removed from the plan even if they were no longer
prudent investments, and prevented the Plan from using alternative recordkeepers who could provide
superior services at a lower cost. In so doing, Defendants abdicated their duty to independently assess
the prudence of each option in the Plan on an ongoing basis, and to act prudently and solely in the
interest of participants in selecting the Plan's recordkeeper. By allowing TIAA-CREF to dictate these
terms, Defendants favored the financial interests of TIAA-CREF in receiving a steady stream of revenues
from TIAA-CREF's proprietary funds over the interest of participants.

Id. at ¶ 227. (emphasis in original). In their second cause of action, they assert that "[b]y allowing the Plan to be locked
into an unreasonable arrangement . . . Defendants caused the Plan to engage in transactions that it knew or should
have known constituted" a prohibited transaction "each time the Plan paid fees to TIAA-CREF." Id. at ¶ 233.
These claims are subject to a six-year limitations period, which is shortened to three years if the plaintiff had actual
knowledge of the breach. 29 U.S.C. § 1113 . The plaintiffs do not allege a specific date as to when Duke entered into
the agreement with TIAA-CREF which "locked" Duke in to both offering the specified TIAA-CREF products and to
using TIAA-CREF's recordkeeping services, see Doc 24 at ¶ 81, though they do allege facts indicating that Duke had
entered into the arrangement with TIAA-CREF by 2010. Doc. 24 at ¶¶ 169, 181. The defendants proffer the 2009
Form 5500 it filed, showing that TIAA-CREF was an "investment" carrier" in that year. See, e.g., Doc. 35-10 at 85. The
plaintiffs do not dispute that date, see Doc. 38 at 10,1 and instead contend that their claim is timely because it is
based on the fact that the defendants maintained the arrangement with TIAA-CREF and, as to the first cause of
action, failed to monitor and remove CREF stock from the plan because of the "locked-in" agreement, Doc. 38 at
10-11, and, as to the second cause of action, engaged in prohibited transactions within the limitations period. Doc. 38
at 25.
The plaintiffs' contentions are inconsistent with their allegations, which clearly state that the violations are based on
the "inclusion" of the locking-in provision and Duke's decision to "commit[] the Plan to an imprudent arrangement," to
"allow[] the Plan to be locked into an unreasonable arrangement," and to "shackle[]the Plan." This act occurred no
later than 2009, or, considering only the allegations in the complaint, no later [*3] than 2010. This lawsuit was filed in
January 2017, more than six years after 2010. Thus these claims, as pled, are barred by the statute of limitations, and
will be dismissed.
The eighth cause of action fails to state a claim. While a plaintiff need not prove a claim in the complaint, some
specific facts must be alleged to make the claim plausible. That is not the case as to this cause of action, which is
hypothetical and conclusory.
© 2018 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service
// PAGE 2
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The third, fourth, and fifth causes of action plausibly allege claims on which relief may be granted. The defendants
failed to establish a basis for dismissing the seventh cause of action in their initial brief in support. The Court declines
to consider a new argument first raised in the reply brief as to this cause of action.
In the sixth cause of action, the plaintiffs allege that TIAA-CREF, VALIC, Fidelity, and Vanguard are parties-in-interest
"as the plan's providers of investment services." Doc. 24 at ¶ 265. They further allege that the defendants engaged in
prohibited transactions "[b]y placing investment options in the Plan in investment options managed by TIAA-CREF,
VALIC, Fidelity, and Vanguard." Doc. 24 at ¶ 266. To the extent the plaintiffs are alleging that it was a prohibited
transaction to invest in mutual funds because the entities providing the mutual funds are parties-in-interest by virtue of
making mutual funds available for investment, the statute precludes that argument. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) .2 If
the plaintiffs meant to allege a claim based on some other theory or facts, that is not clear from the amended
complaint.3 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 , 93 , 127 S. Ct. 2197 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) ( holding that the
complaint should give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests). The sixth
claim for relief will be dismissed.
It is ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint, Doc. 34, is:
1. GRANTED as to the plaintiffs' First, Second, Sixth, and Eighth Causes of Action; and
2. DENIED as to the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Causes of Action.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs' first motion to exclude outside materials reference in defendant's reply brief,
Doc. 41, is GRANTED.
This the 11th day of May, 2017.
/s/ Catherine C. Eagles
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
fn 1
Courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Am.
Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212 , 234 (4th Cir. 2004). A court may, however, consider
documents that are integral to and relied upon in the complaint and whose authenticity is not in dispute.
Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523 , 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006); accord, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
, 551 U.S. 308 , 322 , 127 S. Ct. 2499 , 168 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2007).
fn 2
The same is true to the extent the plaintiffs base their claim on the plan's purchase of annuity contracts. See
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24. See 49 Fed. Reg. 13208 -03, 13211 (Apr. 3, 1984)
fn 3
In the briefing on this issue, the plaintiffs say these four entities are parties-in-interest because they are recordkeepers who furnished services to the plan. That is not, however, what they said in Count VI of the amended
complaint. Doc. 24 at ¶ 265. One cannot amend a complaint in a brief. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's
Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175 , 184-185 (4th Cir. 2013). Even if it were appropriately
alleged that it was the record-keeper role which gave rise to the party-in-interest status asserted in the sixth cause
of action, it is still not clear which of the preceding two hundred and sixty-four paragraphs are relevant and what
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss13/19
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exactly gives rise to the prohibited transaction claim the sixth cause of action purports to set forth. See Stanard v.
Nygren, 658 F.3d 792 , 797 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that defendants are entitled to "fair notice of the claims against
them and the grounds supporting the claims" and that the complaint should be sufficient to "frame the issue and
provide the basis for informed pretrial proceedings").
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In the sixth cause of action, the plaintiffs allege that TIAA-CREF, VALIC,
Fidelity, and Vanguard are parties-in-interest "as the plan's providers
of investment services." Doc. 24 at ¶ 265 . They further allege that the
defendants engaged in prohibited transactions "[b]y placing investment
options in the Plan in investment options managed by TIAA-CREF, VALIC,
Fidelity, and Vanguard." Doc. 24 at ¶ 266 . To the extent the plaintiffs are
alleging that it was a prohibited transaction to invest in mutual funds because
the entities providing the mutual funds are parties-in-interest by virtue of
making mutual funds available for investment, the statute precludes that
argument. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) . 2 If the plaintiffs meant to
allege a claim based on some other theory or facts, that is not clear from
the amended complaint. 3 See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89 , 93
, 127 S. Ct. 2197 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (holding that the complaint
should give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests). The sixth claim for relief will be dismissed.
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defendants engaged in prohibited transactions "[b]y placing investment
options in the Plan in investment options managed by TIAA-CREF, VALIC,
Fidelity, and Vanguard." Doc. 24 at ¶ 266 . To the extent the plaintiffs are
alleging that it was a prohibited transaction to invest in mutual funds because
the entities providing the mutual funds are parties-in-interest by virtue of
making mutual funds available for investment, the statute precludes that
argument. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) . 2 If the plaintiffs meant to
allege a claim based on some other theory or facts, that is not clear from
the amended complaint. 3 See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89 , 93
, 127 S. Ct. 2197 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (holding that the complaint
should give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests). The sixth claim for relief will be dismissed.
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These claims are subject to a six-year limitations period, which is shortened
to three years if the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1113 . The plaintiffs do not allege a specific date as to when Duke entered
into the agreement with TIAA-CREF which "locked" Duke in to both offering
the specified TIAA-CREF products and to using TIAA-CREF's recordkeeping
services, see Doc 24 at ¶ 81 , though they do allege facts indicating that
Duke had entered into the arrangement with TIAA-CREF by 2010. Doc. 24
at ¶¶ 169 , 181. The defendants proffer the 2009 Form 5500 it filed, showing
that TIAA-CREF was an "investment" carrier" in that year. See, e.g. , Doc.
35-10 at 85. The plaintiffs do not dispute that date, see Doc. 38 at 10, 1
and instead contend that their claim is timely because it is based on the fact
that the defendants maintained the arrangement with TIAA-CREF and, as
to the first cause of action, failed to monitor and remove CREF stock from
the plan because of the "locked-in" agreement, Doc. 38 at 10-11, and, as to
the second cause of action, engaged in prohibited transactions within the
limitations period. Doc. 38 at 25.
...
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defendants engaged in prohibited transactions "[b]y placing investment
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options in the Plan in investment options managed by TIAA-CREF, VALIC,
Fidelity, and Vanguard." Doc. 24 at ¶ 266 . To the extent the plaintiffs are
alleging that it was a prohibited transaction to invest in mutual funds because
the entities providing the mutual funds are parties-in-interest by virtue of
making mutual funds available for investment, the statute precludes that
argument. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) . 2 If the plaintiffs meant to
allege a claim based on some other theory or facts, that is not clear from
the amended complaint. 3 See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89 , 93
, 127 S. Ct. 2197 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (holding that the complaint
should give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests). The sixth claim for relief will be dismissed.
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services, see Doc 24 at ¶ 81 , though they do allege facts indicating that
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at ¶¶ 169 , 181. The defendants proffer the 2009 Form 5500 it filed, showing
that TIAA-CREF was an "investment" carrier" in that year. See, e.g. , Doc.
35-10 at 85. The plaintiffs do not dispute that date, see Doc. 38 at 10, 1
and instead contend that their claim is timely because it is based on the fact
that the defendants maintained the arrangement with TIAA-CREF and, as
to the first cause of action, failed to monitor and remove CREF stock from
the plan because of the "locked-in" agreement, Doc. 38 at 10-11, and, as to
the second cause of action, engaged in prohibited transactions within the
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that TIAA-CREF was an "investment" carrier" in that year. See, e.g. , Doc.
35-10 at 85. The plaintiffs do not dispute that date, see Doc. 38 at 10, 1
and instead contend that their claim is timely because it is based on the fact
that the defendants maintained the arrangement with TIAA-CREF and, as
to the first cause of action, failed to monitor and remove CREF stock from
the plan because of the "locked-in" agreement, Doc. 38 at 10-11, and, as to
the second cause of action, engaged in prohibited transactions within the
limitations period. Doc. 38 at 25.
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|
Signed 05/10/2017
Synopsis
Background: Participants and beneficiaries brought
putative class action against retirement plans' fiduciaries
and others under Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), alleging that fiduciaries did not use their
bargaining power to negotiate for lower expenses, did
not exercise proper judgment in deciding what investment
options to include in plans, and allowed recordkeepers
to tie plans to certain investment options and collect
unlimited asset-based compensation from their own
proprietary products. Defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.

[5] fiduciaries did not engage in prohibited transactions
under ERISA by including mutual funds offered by
recordkeepers as investment options; and
[6] participants and beneficiaries stated claim for breach
of ERISA's duty of loyalty.

Motion granted in part and denied in part.

West Headnotes (17)
[1]

Labor and Employment
Prudence
Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated claim against plan fiduciaries for
breach of ERISA's duty of prudence, based
on choosing retail-class shares with higher
fees over institutional-class shares with lower
fees, by alleging that fiduciaries did not use
their bargaining power to obtain the lower
cost fees, that lower cost options were the
exact same as the higher cost shares except
for the actual fees charged to participants, and
that no reasonable fiduciary would choose
or be complacent with being provided retailclass shares over institutional-class shares.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

Holdings: The District Court, Charles A. Pannell, Jr., J.,
held that:
[1] participants and beneficiaries stated claim for breach
of ERISA's duty of prudence, based on fiduciaries
allegedly choosing retail-class shares with higher fees over
institutional-class shares with lower fees;

Cases that cite this headnote
[2]

[2] fiduciaries did not breach ERISA's duty of prudence
by allegedly offering too many investment options for
participants;

Labor and Employment
Prudence
Retirement plan fiduciaries did not breach
ERISA's duty of prudence by allegedly
offering too many investment options for
participants; having too many options did not
hurt participants, but instead provided them
opportunities to choose the investments that
they preferred. Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. §
1104(a)(1)(B).

[3] participants and beneficiaries stated claim for breach
of ERISA's duty of prudence, based on fiduciaries' use of
three separate recordkeepers for the plans;
[4] participants and beneficiaries stated prohibited
transaction claim, based on fiduciaries agreeing to lock in
certain types of investments;

2 Cases that cite this headnote
[3]

Labor and Employment
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continued to retain particular accounts as
investment options despite their histories of
substantial underperformance and excessive
and unnecessary fees compared to available
alternatives. Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. §
1104(a)(1)(B).

Prudence
Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated claim against plan fiduciaries
for breach of ERISA's duty of prudence,
based on fiduciaries' use of actively managed
funds instead of passively managed funds,
by alleging that fiduciaries did not properly
analyze funds used in the plans, were
forced to use certain funds provided by
recordkeepers, were persuaded by certain
recordkeepers to use their funds without
researching other funds, and that had they
analyzed the funds, they would have learned
that actively managed funds, including funds
recordkeepers required the plans to use, would
not outperform similar passively managed
funds. Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

2 Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

A plaintiff may allege that a fiduciary
breached the duty of prudence under ERISA
by failing to properly monitor investments
and remove imprudent ones. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404,
29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Labor and Employment
Prudence

[7]

Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated claim against plan fiduciaries
for breach of ERISA's duty of prudence,
based on fees assessed for annuities offered by
plans, by alleging that distribution expenses
were charged for marketing and advertising
fund to potential investors, but participants
had no choice as the funds were selected by
plans' sponsor, mortality and expense risk
charges assessed were not relevant to all
participants, but benefited only participants
who elected to annuitize their holdings upon
retirement, and that expenses aided the fund
companies but not the participants. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404,
29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

Cases that cite this headnote
[8]

retirement
fiduciaries
prudence,
fiduciaries

Labor and Employment
Prudence
Allegations by participants and beneficiaries
of retirement plans that plan fiduciaries'
revenue sharing was improper and
overcompensated the recordkeepers were
sufficient to state claim for breach of ERISA's
duty of prudence. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

Labor and Employment
Prudence
Participants and beneficiaries of
plans stated claim against plan
for breach of ERISA's duty of
where they alleged that

Labor and Employment
Prudence
Allegations by participants and beneficiaries
of retirement plans that plan fiduciaries
should have used a stable value fund instead
of a traditional annuity were sufficient to
state claim against fiduciaries for breach
of ERISA's duty of prudence. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404,
29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

Cases that cite this headnote
[5]

Labor and Employment
Prudence

2 Cases that cite this headnote
[9]

Labor and Employment
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them and remove imprudent investments.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

Prudence
Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated claim against plan fiduciaries
for breach of ERISA's duty of prudence,
based on fiduciaries' use of three separate
recordkeepers for the plans, where they
alleged that the use of three recordkeepers
was an inefficient and costly structure that
caused participants to pay excessive and
unreasonable fees for plan recordkeeping
and administrative services and that similarly
sized plans had single recordkeeper instead
of multiple recordkeepers, which helped keep
costs lower. Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. §
1104(a)(1)(B).
Cases that cite this headnote
[10]

[12]

Cases that cite this headnote
Labor and Employment
Prudence
Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated claim against plan fiduciaries for
breach of ERISA's duty of prudence, based
on fiduciaries allegedly allowing recordkeeper
to mandate inclusion of a particular account
in plans and require that it provide
recordkeeping for its proprietary options,
where they alleged that fiduciaries acted
imprudently by “locking in” to a particular
account and recordkeeper, had no process to
remove those accounts, and failed to monitor

Labor and Employment
Prudence
ERISA's duty of prudence involves a
continuing duty to monitor investments and
remove imprudent ones under trust law.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
Cases that cite this headnote

[13]

Federal Civil Procedure
Fact issues
Issue of whether prohibited transactions
claim under ERISA by retirement plan
participants and beneficiaries against plan
fiduciaries was time-barred could not be
resolved on fiduciaries' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, since it was not
clear from the pleadings when the alleged
prohibited transactions took place. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§
406, 413, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1106(a), 1113.

Labor and Employment
Prudence
Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated claim against plan fiduciaries
for breach of ERISA's duty of prudence,
where they alleged that fiduciaries should
have solicited bids for recordkeeping services
every three years and their failure to do so
caused plans to pay over 1140% and 1843%
more than what was a reasonable fee for
recordkeeping services. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

[11]

Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote
[14]

Labor and Employment
Prohibited transactions; parties in
interest
Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated prohibited transaction claim
under ERISA against plan fiduciaries, based
on fiduciaries agreeing to lock in certain types
of investments, by alleging that plans locked
into an arrangement that required the plans
to include particular stock account and use a
particular recordkeeper, even though the fees
were unreasonable for the services provided,
that fiduciaries knew or should have known
that the transactions were prohibited, that
transactions occurred each time plans paid
fees in connection with plans' investment in
the challenged account. Employee Retirement
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Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 3, 406, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(14)(B), 1106(A), (C), and
(D).
Cases that cite this headnote
[15]

Labor and Employment
Prohibited transactions; parties in
interest
Retirement plan fiduciaries did not engage
in prohibited transactions under ERISA
by including mutual funds offered by
investment companies, which also served as
recordkeepers for the plans, as investment
options in the plans, since mutual funds were
exempt from being a party-in-interest under
ERISA. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-1 et seq.; Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 3,
406, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(14)(B), 1002(21)(B),
1106(a).
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[16]

Labor and Employment
Prohibited transactions; parties in
interest
Retirement plan fiduciaries did not engage in
prohibited transactions under ERISA when
plans paid fees collected from mutual funds to
a vendor through revenue sharing, since fees
collected from a mutual fund did not become
assets of the plans. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 406, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1106(a)(1)(D).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[17]

Labor and Employment
Duties in general
Participants and beneficiaries of retirement
plans stated claim against plan fiduciaries
for breach of ERISA's duty of loyalty by
alleging that plans did not act for the benefit of
the plans' participants. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
Cases that cite this headnote
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Opinion
*1348 ORDER
CHARLES A. PANNELL, JR., United States District
Judge
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion
to dismiss the first amended complaint [Doc. No. 41]. As
an initial matter, the defendants' previously-filed motion
to dismiss the complaint [Doc. No. 27] is dismissed as
MOOT.

I. Facts
The plaintiffs bring this case “individually and as
representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries
of the Emory University Retirement Plan and the Emory
Healthcare, Inc. Retirement Savings and Matching
Plan (the “Plans”).” Am. Compl. ¶ 1 [Doc. No. 30].
The plaintiffs' primary allegations are that the Plans'
fiduciaries did not use their bargaining power to
negotiate for lower expenses, exercise proper judgment
in deciding what investment options to include in the
Plans, allowing the recordkeepers to tie the Plans to
certain investment options, and collecting “unlimited
asset-based compensation from their own proprietary
products.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4 [Doc. No. 30]. “The Plans
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provide for retirement income for employees of Emory
University, Emory Healthcare, Inc., Emory–Children's
Center, Inc. (fka Emory Children's Center, Inc.), Wesley
Woods Center of Emory University, Inc., and Emory
Specialty Associations, LLC, each of which have adopted
the Plans with the consent of Emory University or Emory
Healthcare, Inc.” Am. Compl. ¶ 11 [Doc. No. 30].
The Emory University Retirement Plan had $2.6 billion in
net assets and 20,261 participants with account balances as
of December 31, 2014. Am. Compl. ¶ 12 [Doc. No. 30]. As
of that same date, the Emory Healthcare, Inc. Retirement
Savings and Matching Plan had $1.06 billion in net
assets and 21,536 participants with account balances.
Am. Compl. ¶ 12 [Doc. No. 30]. The Emory University
Investment Office develops the Plan investment strategy
and investment policies. Am. Compl. ¶ 30 [Doc. No.
30]. The Emory University Investment Office manages
the assets of the Plans. Am. Compl. ¶ 30 [Doc. No.
30]. “Emory Investment Management is responsible
for selecting, retaining, and terminating the external
investment managers and investment vehicles for the
Plans, monitoring those investments, and implementing
and ensuring compliance with the investment policies
established by the Investment Committee.” Am. Compl. ¶
32 [Doc. No. 30]. The Emory University Board of Trustees
oversees Emory Investment Management, and sets the
investment policies for the Plans. Am. Compl. ¶ 33 [Doc.
No. 30]. “The Investment Committee sets the Statement
of Investment Objectives, Policies, and Guidelines (also
known as an investment policy statement, or IPS) for
the Plans ... [and sets investment objectives, establishing
investment standards] and reviewing the reasonableness
of Plan fees at least annually.” Am. Compl. ¶ 33
[Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs assert that the Emory
Investment Management, the Emory Pension Board, and
the individual members are fiduciaries to the Plans. Am.
Compl. ¶ 39 [Doc. No. 30].
The Emory Plans are known as 403(b) plans. Am. Compl.
¶ 81 [Doc. No. 30]. “Tax-exempt organizations, public
schools (including state colleges and universities), and
churches are eligible to offer plans qualified under §
403(b), commonly known as 403(b) plans. 26 U.S.C. §
403(b)(1)(A).” Am. Compl. ¶ 81 [Doc. No. 30].

II. Legal Standard
When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the court must take the facts alleged in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. Avmed, Inc., 693 F.3d
1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2012). To survive Rule 12(b)
(6) scrutiny, *1349 “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “[F]acial plausibility”
exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

III. Analysis
A. Plaintiffs' Prudence Claims
“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect
to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and ... with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
a like character and with like aims.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1)(B). The defendants' first argument is that the plaintiffs'
prudence claims fail as a matter of law.

1. Count V
The defendants make two broad arguments to dismiss
Count V. They argue that the plaintiffs fail to state a
plausible claim that the Plans' investment management
fees were excessive. Additionally, the defendants claim
that the plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the
defendants imprudently retained underperforming funds.

a. The Defendants' Assertion that the Plans'
Investment Management Fees Fall Within the
Range that Courts have held to be Prudent
[1] The Plans have over $3 billion in assets. Am. Compl.
¶ 12 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that
jumbo retirement plans, similar to the Plans, have great
bargaining power when choosing what type of shares to
offer its participants. Am. Compl. ¶ 169 [Doc. No. 30].
For instance, the plaintiffs assert that many of the Plans'
retail class investment options also offered a similar lower-
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cost institutional class share, but that the Plans failed
to use its bargaining power to obtain the institutional
class shares for the Plans. Am. Compl. ¶ 170 [Doc.
No. 30]. Additionally, the plaintiffs' complaint states
that Vanguard and TIAA–CREF mutual funds routinely
allow a waiver for large investment funds (similar to
the Plans) to obtain lower cost shares even if they have
not met the usual minimum asset threshold necessary
to offer lower-cost institutional class shares to the Plans
participants. Am. Compl. ¶ 174 [Doc. No. 30]. The
complaint sets out close to 100 mutual funds used by the
Plans with higher costs than identical mutual funds the
Plans could have attempted to negotiate for with lower
costs. Am. Compl. ¶ 176 [Doc. No. 30]. The defendants
argue that the Plans' investment options offer a range of
expense ratios from 0.07% to 1.41%, and that many courts
have found this range to be reasonable. Defs.' Br. [Doc.
No. 41–1 at 17].
The plaintiffs have properly stated a claim that
choosing retail-class shares over institutional-class shares
is imprudent. 1 See Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588
F.3d 585, 595–96 (8th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs claim
that offering retail-class shares with a higher expense ratio
versus institutional-class shares with a lower expense ratio
may be unacceptable. The plaintiffs' complaint asserts that
the retail-class shares and the institutional-class shares
were the exact same except for the expenses *1350
charged to participants. While, the defendants argue and
point to cases that hold that a motion to dismiss should
be granted if based solely on retail versus institutional
class shares, those cases also point out many other reasons
why a plan chose one class over the other. In this case,
the plaintiffs allege that the defendants did not use their
bargaining power to obtain the lower cost fees and that
the lower cost options are the exact same as the higher cost
shares except for the actual fees charged. The plaintiffs
assert that no reasonable fiduciary would choose or be
complacent with being provided retail-class shares over
institutional-class shares.
[2] Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that having too many
investment options is imprudent. The plaintiffs asserted
that the Plans offered 111 investment options, and that
many of those options were duplicative. Instead, the
plaintiffs allege that the Plans should have offered fewer
options and used more bargaining leverage with those
investment options to obtain lower fees. The court does
not agree with the plaintiffs' theory. Having too many

options does not hurt the Plans' participants, but instead
provides them opportunities to choose the investments
that they prefer. Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667,
673–74 (7th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs' allegations that
the defendants acted imprudently by offering too many
investment options does not state a claim for relief.

b. The Defendants' Assertion that the Plaintiffs
Cannot State a Claim for Imprudence Based
on the Use of Actively Managed Funds
[3] The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have not
stated a claim that they acted imprudently by including
actively managed funds instead of solely passively
managed funds. The plaintiffs argue that the Plans'
administrative and recordkeeping providers required the
defendants to include their preferred investment lineup
in the plan as investment options for participants. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 78, 137 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs contend
that these fund options were not included in the Plans
based on the best interest of the participants, but instead
to benefit the Plans' service providers. Am. Compl. ¶¶
78, 137 [Doc. No. 30]. TIAA–CREF required the Plans
to “offer its flagship CREF Stock Account and Money
Market Account, and to also use TIAA as recordkeeper
for its proprietary products.” Am. Compl. ¶ 136 [Doc. No.
30]. The plaintiffs argue that the Plans should have instead
used an open architecture model. That would allow the
Plans' fiduciaries to choose funds independently and in the
best interest of the participants because the Plans would
not be subject to using only the provider's investment
products. Am. Compl. ¶ 79 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs
contend that the defendants failed to properly analyze the
funds allowed in the Plans, and that if they had analyzed
the funds they would have learned that the actively
managed funds (including the funds the recordkeepers
required the Plans to use) would not outperform similar
passively managed funds. Am. Compl. ¶ 206 [Doc. No.
30]. Even if an investment was no longer prudent, the
plaintiffs argue that the defendants' agreement with the
Plans' providers would not allow many of the funds to be
removed because the contract with the providers required
the Plans to retain the investment options. Am. Compl. ¶
217 [Doc. No. 30].
The defendants argue generally that the plaintiffs' claim
fails because simply having an actively managed fund
instead of a passive fund is not imprudent. Defs.' Br. [Doc.
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No. 41–1 at 18–19]. However, the plaintiffs' claims are not
that simplistic. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants
acted imprudently because they did not properly analyze
the funds used in the Plans, were *1351 forced to use
certain funds provided by the recordkeepers, and the
Plans' fiduciaries were persuaded by certain recordkeepers
to use their funds without researching or choosing other
funds. The plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the
defendants' process for choosing and analyzing certain
funds was flawed. See Braden, 588 F.3d at 595–96 (finding
that “the process by which appellees selected and managed
the funds in the Plan would have been tainted by failure of
effort, competence, or loyalty”). The defendants' assertion
that the plaintiffs have not properly alleged that the
defendants' use of actively managed funds was imprudent
fails.

plaintiffs allege that all five of the expenses aid the fund
companies but not the Plans' participants. Am. Compl. ¶¶
141, 144, 278 [Doc. No. 30].

c. The Defendants' Assertion that the Plaintiffs'
Fee “Layering” Claim Fails to State a Claim

[5] The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claim
that the defendants retained underperforming stocks
should be dismissed. Specifically, the defendants point
to the CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate
Account. The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that “The
CREF Stock Account ... had a long history of substantial
underperformance compared to ... actively managed
alternatives over the one-, five-, and ten-year periods
ending December 31, 2009.” Am. Compl. ¶ 226 [Doc.
No. 30]. Likewise, the plaintiffs contend that “The TIAA
Real Estate Account had a long history of substantial
underperformance relative to the Vanguard REIT Index
over the one-, five-, and ten-year periods ending December
31, 2009.” Am. *1352 Compl. ¶ 238 [Doc. No. 30].
The plaintiffs allege that “The CREF Stock Account
has excessive and unnecessary fees, has consistently
underperformed for years, and continues to underperform
its benchmark ... and underperformed lower-cost actively
and passively managed investments that were available to
the Plans, yet has not been removed from the Plans nor
frozen to new investments.” Am. Compl. ¶ 210 [Doc. No.
30]. Further, the plaintiffs state, “Historical performances
of the CREF Stock Account has been persistently poor for
many years compared to ... [the] benchmark index (Russell
3000 Index), and also as compared to available low-cost
index funds.” Am. Compl. ¶ 222 [Doc. No. 30]. Presently,
the parties disagree as to what the correct benchmark is
for the CREF Stock Account. The proper benchmark can
be more appropriately determined on summary judgment.

[4] The defendants argue that the fees assessed for the
annuities offered by the Plans were reasonable and not
excessive. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1 at 19]. The plaintiffs
allege that two of the accounts included in the Plans charge
unnecessary fees. They allege that the CREF Variable
Annuity Accounts include unneeded layers of expense
charges, including: an administrative expense charge, a
distribution expense charge, a mortality and expense risk
charge, and an investment advisory expense charge. Am.
Compl. ¶ 140 [Doc. No. 30]. Additionally, they contend
that the TIAA Real Estate Account includes those
same four expenses, and a fifth expense for a liquidity
guarantee. Am. Compl. ¶ 143 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs
argue that the distribution expenses and mortality and
expense risk charges are unnecessary for the Plans. Am.
Compl. ¶ 141 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs' first allegation
is that the administrative and investment management
expenses were excessive for the services provided. The
amended complaint then alleges that distribution expenses
are charged for marketing and advertising the fund to
potential investors, but the plaintiffs claim that this is
unnecessary since the funds are selected by the Plans'
sponsor and the participants have no choice. Am. Compl.
¶ 141 [Doc. No. 30]. Additionally, the plaintiffs state
that the mortality and expense risk charges assessed are
not relevant to all participants, but benefit only those
participants that elect to annuitize their holdings upon
retirement. Am. Compl. ¶ 141 [Doc. No. 30]. Finally, the

The fees charged by funds in a plan should benefit
the participants. See Braden, 588 F.3d at 595–96.
Additionally, the fund options chosen for a plan should
not favor the fund provider or the fiduciary over the
participants. See id. at 596. Thus, the plaintiffs' allegations
that the Plans' funds charged fees that were excessive and/
or provided a benefit to TIAA but not to the benefit of the
participants are sufficient to state a claim for relief.

d. The Defendants' Assertion that the Plaintiffs
Fail to Plausibly Allege that Defendants
Imprudently Retained Underperforming Funds
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Similarly to the CREF Stock Account, the plaintiffs
allege that the “Defendants failed to conduct such a
process and continue to retain the TIAA Real Estate
Account as a Plan Investment option despite its continued
underperformance and higher cost compared to available
investment alternatives.” Am. Compl. ¶ 240 [Doc. No.
30]. The defendants again argue that the plaintiffs used
incorrect comparisons to the TIAA Real Estate Account.
As set forth above, the proper benchmark can be more
appropriately determined on summary judgment.
[6] The plaintiffs have properly alleged that
the defendants acted imprudently by retaining
underperforming funds. “A plaintiff may allege that a
fiduciary breached the duty of prudence by failing to
properly monitor investments and remove imprudent
ones.” Tibble v. Edison Int'l, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1823,
1829, 191 L.Ed.2d 795 (2015). The plaintiffs' allegations
sufficiently state that the defendants failed to remove the
CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Account
after periods of underperformance and higher costs
compared to similar funds. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 210, 240 [Doc.
No. 30]. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants
acted imprudently by retaining the CREF Stock Account
and TIAA Real Estate Account will not be dismissed.

e. The TIAA Traditional Annuity
[7] The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the
defendants should have used a stable value fund instead
of the TIAA Traditional Annuity. Am. Compl. ¶ 98 [Doc.
No. 30]. The defendants argue that stable value funds have
underperformed the TIAA Traditional Annuity over the
last one, three, five, and ten years. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–
1 at 25]. The defendants are improperly arguing questions
of fact at this stage. Taking the plaintiffs allegations as
true, a stable fund could have been an alternative option to
the TIAA Traditional Annuity. Therefore, the court will
not dismiss the plaintiffs' claim related to an alternative
investment option to the TIAA Traditional Annuity.

2. Count III
Count III relates to the Plans charging unreasonable
administrative fees. The defendants argue that the types of
fees charged are reasonable and commonly used.

a. The Defendants' Argument that “Revenue
Sharing” is a Common and Accepted Practice
[8] Revenue sharing is “a common method of
compensation whereby the mutual funds on a defined
contribution plan pay a portion of investor fees to a third
party.” Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir.
2014). The defendants argue that “revenue sharing” is
common industry practice. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1 at
26]. They contend that “revenue sharing” is *1353 more
beneficial to participants with lower balances (because the
participants with lower balances will pay fees proportional
to their total assets instead of paying the same fee as all
participants in the Plan) than a flat-rate per-participant
fee where each participant pays identical fees. Defs.' Br.
[Doc. No. 41–1 at 26].
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that “Revenue sharing,
while not a per se violation of ERISA, can lead to excessive
fees if not properly monitored and capped.” Am. Compl. ¶
74 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs argue that a recordkeeper's
fee should depend on the number of participants and not
the amount of assets in a plan. Am. Compl. ¶ 71 [Doc.
No. 30]. The plaintiffs' allege that the defendants' “revenue
sharing” method is improper and overcompensates the
recordkeepers. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 74–75 [Doc. No. 30].
At this point, the plaintiffs' do not have the burden
“to rule out every possible lawful explanation” for the
allegedly overcharged recordkeepers' fees used in the Plan.
Braden, 588 F.3d at 596–97. The defendants can be held
accountable for failing to monitor and making sure that
the recordkeepers charged appropriate fees and did not
receive overpayments for their services. Tussey, 746 F.3d
at 336. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim regarding “revenue
sharing” will not be dismissed.

b. The Defendants' Assertion that ERISA does
not Require Fiduciaries to Utilize a Single
Recordkeeper or Solicit Recordkeeping Bids
[9] The defendants continue to argue issues of fact at
the motion to dismiss stage instead of attempting to
show that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. They
argue that the plaintiffs failed to allege that one vendor
would have been able to provide the needed investment
options. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1 at 27]. The defendants
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suggest that it may be reasonable that Fidelity, TIAA,
and Vanguard (all three of which the defendants use
as recordkeepers) are the best options to use. Defs.' Br.
[Doc. No. 41–1 at 27]. On the other hand, the plaintiffs'
complaint states “Despite the long-recognized benefits of
a single recordkeeper for a defined contribution plan,
Defendants have continued to contract with three separate
recordkeepers for the Plans: TIAA–CREF, Fidelity, and
Vanguard. This inefficient and costly structure has caused
Plan participants to pay excessive and unreasonable fees
for Plan recordkeeping and administrative services.” Am.
Compl. ¶ 150 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs also allege that
similarly-sized plans have a single recordkeeper instead of
multiple recordkeepers, which helps keep costs lower. Am.
Compl. ¶ 149 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs' allegation that
a prudent fiduciary would have chosen one recordkeeper
instead of three is sufficient to state a claim for relief.
[10] Additionally, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs'
claim to have a competitive bidding process to choose
a recordkeeper should be dismissed. Defs.' Br. [Doc.
No. 41–1 at 27]. The plaintiffs allege in their amended
complaint that the defendants should have put the
recordkeeping services out for competitive bidding every
three years. Am. Compl. ¶ 148 [Doc. No. 30]. The
amended complaint states, “the Plan's fiduciaries caused
the Retirement Plan to pay well over 1140% and
1843% more than what was a reasonable fee for
recordkeeping services.” Am. Compl. ¶ 161 [Doc. No. 30].
The defendants argue that nothing in ERISA requires
competitive bidding. However, the plaintiffs' allegation of
the absence of competitive bidding for the recordkeeping
services was imprudent; therefore, the plaintiffs' claim is
sufficient to state a claim for relief. See George v. Kraft
Foods Glob., Inc., 641 F.3d 786, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2011).

*1354 3. Count I
[11] The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' “Locking
In” claim (Count I) fails as a matter of law and is timebarred. The plaintiffs' allege in their amended complaint
that:
By allowing TIAA–CREF to
mandate the inclusion of the CREF
Stock Account and Money Market
Account in the Plans, as well
as the TIAA Traditional Annuity,

and to require that it provide
recordkeeping for its proprietary
options, Defendants committed the
Plans to an imprudent arrangement
in which certain investments had
to be included and could not be
removed from the plan even if they
were no longer prudent investments,
and prevented the Plans from
using alternative recordkeepers who
could provide superior services
at a lower cost. In so doing,
Defendants abdicated their duty to
independently assess the prudence
of each option in the Plans on
an ongoing basis, and to act
prudently and solely in the interest
of participants in selecting the
Plans' recordkeeper. By allowing
TIAA–CREF to dictate these
terms, Defendants favored the
financial interests of TIAA–CREF
in receiving a steady stream
of revenues from TIAA–CREF's
proprietary funds over the interest of
participants.
Am. Compl. ¶ 250 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs allege
that the defendants failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking to determine the prudence of the investment
options. Am. Compl. ¶ 251 [Doc. No. 30]. “By allowing
the Plans to be bound by this requirement, Defendants
failed to conduct an independent evaluation of the
prudence of this option, which contradicts every principle
of prudent investing because an investment that was no
longer prudent could not be removed from the Plans.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 217 [Doc. No. 30]. The defendants argue
that they did not follow an imprudent process and that
the plaintiffs rely on only hindsight to determine that
the account underperformed. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–
1 at 28]. Additionally, the defendants claim that the
plaintiffs' “Locking In” allegation is time-barred because
the challenged actions occurred more than six years prior
to the filing of the complaint. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1
at 29].
[12] “A plaintiff may allege that a fiduciary breached
the duty of prudence by failing to properly monitor
investments and remove imprudent ones.” Tibble, 135
S.Ct. at 1829. “[T]he duty of prudence involves a
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continuing duty to monitor investments and remove
imprudent ones under trust law.” Id. Here, the plaintiffs
have alleged that the defendants acted imprudently by
“locking in” to the CREF Stock Account and TIAA
Recordkeeping—that the defendants had no process to
remove these accounts and failed to monitor them and
remove imprudent investments. These allegations are
sufficient to state a claim for relief.
As to the defendants' assertion that the plaintiffs' claim
is time-barred, “[n]o action may be commenced ... with
respect to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty,
or obligation under this part, or with respect to a violation
of this part ... (1) six years after (A) the date of the
last action which constituted a part of the breach or
violation.” 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1). The plaintiffs argue that
their claim is timely and “Plaintiffs do not challenge the
initial arrangement, but maintaining the arrangement and
the failure to monitor and remove CREF Stock within
the six years preceding the complaint.” Pls.' Resp. [Doc.
No. 48 at 16]. With this limitation, the plaintiffs' claim
with respect to the failure of the defendants to properly
monitor and/or remove the allegedly imprudent “locked
in” accounts that occurred may proceed. The claims in
Count I will be dismissed to the extent the plaintiffs are
seeking any damages that occurred more *1355 than
six years prior to the complaint being filed caused by
imprudence.

B. The Plaintiffs' Prohibited Transactions Claims
1. Counts II, IV, and VI
[13] The defendants first argue that the plaintiffs'
prohibited transactions claims are time-barred by the sixyear statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1113. The
court will take this matter up at a later date. It is not
clear from the pleadings when the prohibited transactions
took place. For instance, the defendants argue that all
the alleged prohibited transactions took place over six
years prior to this case being filed. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No.
41–1 at 31]. However, the plaintiffs' amended complaint
alleges that the CREF Stock Account, for example, was
included in the Plans beginning in 2010. Am. Compl. ¶
210 [Doc. No. 30]. Therefore, depending on the exact date
that account was included in the Plans, that transaction
may have occurred within six years of this suit being filed.
Furthermore, the court will not determine at this time

whether there is a duty by the defendants to continually
monitor and remove prohibited transactions like in Tibble,
135 S.Ct. at 1829, or if the plaintiffs have a claim for only
the original transaction that took place.
[14] The defendants next argue that Count II's prohibited
transaction claim should be dismissed because there is
no relevant case law prohibiting a plan from agreeing
to lock in a certain type of investment. The prohibited
transactions statute states:
(1) A fiduciary with respect to
a plan shall not cause the plan
to engage in a transaction, if he
knows or should know that such
transaction constitutes a direct or
indirect—(A) sale or exchange, or
leasing, of any property between the
plan and a party in interest; (B)
lending of money or other extension
of credit between the plan and a
party in interest; (C) furnishing of
goods, services, or facilities between
the plan and a party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for
the benefit of a party in interest,
of any assets of the plan; or (E)
acquisition on behalf of the plan, of
any employer security or employer
real property in violation of section
1107(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a). “The term ‘party in interest’ means,
as to an employee benefit plan ... a person providing
services to such plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B). Count II
of the amended complaint alleges that the Plans locked
into an arrangement that required the Plans to include the
CREF Stock Account and use TIAA as a recordkeeper,
even though the fees were unreasonable for the services
provided. Am. Compl. ¶ 256 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs
contend that the defendants knew or should have known
that these transactions were prohibited by 29 U.S.C. §
1106(A), (C), and (D). The amended complaint states
“These transactions occurred each time the Plans paid fees
to TIAA–CREF in connection with the Plans' investments
in the CREF Stock Account and other proprietary options
that paid revenue sharing to TIAA.” Am. Compl. ¶
256 [Doc. No. 30]. The defendants argue that ERISA
does not prohibit a plan from making a stock account
mandatory. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1 at 33]. However,
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the plaintiffs' allegations that TIAA–CREF is a party
in interest, and that the Plans improperly engaged in a
transaction prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A), (C),
and (D) are sufficient to state a claim for relief.
Next, the defendants argue that Counts IV and VI should
be dismissed because ERISA has an exemption that allows
the recordkeeping and investment payments that the
plaintiffs challenge. Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1 at 34]. “In
particular, 29 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) exempts arrangements
for plan services so long as no more than ‘reasonable
compensation’ is paid.” Defs.' *1356 Br. [Doc. No. 41–
1 at 34]. Whether the fees were unreasonable is an issue
that should be taken up at summary judgment. The
reasonableness of the fees is a defense and did not have
to be pleaded by the plaintiffs. Braden, 588 F.3d at 602
(“In short, the prohibited transactions [under § 1106(a)(1)
] involve self-dealing [and the] settled law is that in such
situations the burden of proof is always on the party to the
self-dealing transaction to justify its fairness.”). Therefore,
the plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state a claim
for a prohibited transaction. The defendants may raise
reasonableness as a defense to the plaintiffs' allegations.
[15] Fourth, the defendants argue that Count VI should
be dismissed because a mutual fund is exempted from
being a party-in-interest. The defendants state “when a
plan invests in a mutual fund, it is not transacting with
[a] party-in-interest.” Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1 at 35].
The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that “By placing
investment options in the Plans in investment options
managed by TIAA–CREF, Fidelity, and Vanguard in
which the entirety of the Plans' approximately $3.7 billion
in combined assets were invested, the Defendants caused
the plans to engage in” prohibited transactions. Am.
Compl. ¶ 290 [Doc. No. 30]. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) states:
If any money or other property of
an employee benefit plan is invested
in securities issued by an investment
company registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940
[15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–1 et seq.], such
investment shall not by itself cause
such investment company or such
investment company's investment
adviser or principal underwriter to
be deemed to be a fiduciary or a

party in interest as those terms are
defined in this subchapter ....
The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates mutual
funds. Here, the Plans had investment options that
included mutual funds, bond account, annuities, real
estate accounts, and others. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127–132 [Doc.
No. 30]. The investment options offered by Fidelity and
Vanguard are exclusively mutual funds. Am. Compl. ¶
132 [Doc. No. 30]. TIAA–CREF's investment options
include many types of investments, including mutual
funds. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127–131 [Doc. No. 30]. The
exception from 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) excluding mutual
funds is applicable to this case. The court will dismiss
Count VI to the extent that the plaintiffs allege the
Plans participated in a prohibited transaction concerning
TIAA–CREF, Fidelity, and Vanguard mutual funds. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B). Count VI will proceed as to all other
investment accounts other than mutual funds included in
the Plans.
[16] Lastly, the defendants argue that “Counts II, IV,
and VI must fail because Plaintiffs do not allege that
the Plans' fiduciaries intended to benefit TIAA, Fidelity,
and Vanguard, as opposed to the Plans and their
participants.” Defs.' Br. [Doc. No. 41–1 at 36]. Whether
the Plans' fiduciaries intended to benefit TIAA, Fidelity,
and Vanguard is an issue that can be better determined
at the motion for summary judgment stage. Therefore,
the court will not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims based on
the defendants' theory that the plaintiffs failed to properly
allege that the fiduciaries intended to benefit a party-ininterest. The defendants also argue that the allegations
in the amended complaint that “a prohibited transaction
occurred each time the Plans paid fees to a vendor through
'revenue sharing fails as a matter of law because revenue
sharing payments are not plan assets ....” Defs.' Br. [Doc.
No. 41–1 at 36]. The defendants rely on Hecker v. Deere &
Co., 556 F.3d 575, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) regarding 29 U.S.C.
§ 1106(a)(1)(D) that “Once the fees are collected from the
mutual fund's assets and transferred to one of the Fidelity
entities, *1357 they become Fidelity's assets again, not
the assets of the Plans.” The Hecker case is fact specific to
mutual funds. The court agrees that fees collected from a
mutual fund do not become assets of the plan, therefore, to
the extent the plaintiffs allege that revenue sharing from a
mutual fund is a prohibited transaction under 29 U.S.C. §
1106(a)(1)(D), those allegations cannot go forward under
Counts II, IV, and VI.

2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Published by The Keep,©2018

11

35

Henderson v. Emory University,
252 F.Supp.3d
1344 (2017)
Journal of Collective
Bargaining
in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 13 [2018], Art. 19
347 Ed. Law Rep. 1012

C. Plaintiffs' Disloyalty Claims
[17] The duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to act “solely
in the interest” of plan participants and beneficiaries
and “for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits
to participants” and “defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). The
plaintiffs have alleged that the Plans did not act for the
benefit of the Plans' participants. Am. Compl. ¶ 248–49,
260–61, 284 [Doc. No. 30]. The plaintiffs' loyalty claims
are sufficient to state a claim for relief.

IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set for above, the defendants' motion
to dismiss [Doc. No. 41] is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The defendants' first motion to dismiss
[Doc. No. 27] is dismissed as MOOT. The plaintiffs'
claim in Count V alleging that the defendants acted

imprudently by offering too many investment options is
DISMISSED. The claims in Count I will be DISMISSED
to the extent the plaintiffs are seeking any damages that
occurred more than six years prior to the complaint being
filed caused by imprudence. Count VI is DISMISSED
to the extent the plaintiffs allege the Plans participated
in a prohibited transaction concerning TIAA–CREF,
Fidelity, and Vanguard mutual funds. Additionally, to the
extent the plaintiffs allege that revenue sharing from a
mutual fund is a prohibited transaction under 29 U.S.C. §
1106(a)(1)(D), these allegations cannot go forward under
Counts II, IV, and VI. All other claims remain.
SO ORDERED this 10 th day of May, 2017.

All Citations
252 F.Supp.3d 1344, 347 Ed. Law Rep. 1012

Footnotes

1

The court notes that the actual fee range of 0.07% to 1.41% may generally be acceptable when the best investment
options are chosen; that range may be unacceptable when lower-cost institutional shares could have been chosen
instead.
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For JENNIFER SWEDA, BENJAMIN A. WIGGINS, ROBERT L. YOUNG, FAITH PICKERING, PUSHKAR SOHONI,
REBECCA N. TONER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF A CLASS OF PARTICIPANTS AND
BENEFICIARIES ON BEHALF OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA MATCHING PLAN, Plaintiffs: DAVID M.
PROMISLOFF, LEAD ATTORNEY, PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC, PHILADELPHIA, PA; SEAN E.
SOYARS, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, ST. LOUIS, MO; HEATHER LEA, MICHAEL A. WOLFF,
SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON, ST LOUIS, MO; JEFFREY J. CIARLANTO, Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto, P.C.,
Philadelphia, PA; JEROME J. SCHLICHTER, TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, ST LOUIS,
MO; KURT C. STRUCKHOFF, SHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, ST LOUIS, MO; STEPHEN M.
HOEPLINGER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, ST LOUIS, MO.
For THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, JACK HEUER, Defendants: BRIAN T. ORTELERE, MICHAEL L.
BANKS, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, PHILADELPHIA, PA; CHRISTOPHER J. BORAN, MORGAN LEWIS &
BOCKIUS, CHICAGO, IL.

GENE E.K. PRATTER, United States District Judge.
GENE E.K. PRATTER

MEMORANDUM
PRATTER, J.
A group of University of Pennsylvania Matching Plan participants and beneficiaries bring this ERISA action against the
University of Pennsylvania and Jack Heuer, Penn's Vice President of Human Resources. The Plan participants allege
that Defendants enabled third-party service providers—here, TIAA-CREF and Vanguard—to collect excessive fees,
increased costs by including duplicative investments in the Plan, and retained underperforming funds in the Plan.
Plaintiffs claim this violated two provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq
("ERISA"). First, they claim a breach of fiduciary duties, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (Counts I, III, V and VII1
). Second, they claim the contracts with TIAA-CREF and Vanguard were prohibited transactions, in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (Counts II, IV and VI).
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The Penn parties urge dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Renfro v.
Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011), controls and demands dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duties claims
(Counts I, III, and V), and that the prohibited transaction claims (Counts II, IV, and VI) are duplicative of the breach
claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion as to all counts.
BACKGROUND 2
The Plan participants bring this action, individually and as representatives of a purported class, as beneficiaries in the
University of Pennsylvania Matching Plan ("Plan"), against the University of Pennsylvania and its Vice President of
Human Resources, for breach of fiduciary duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) . They allege three main
failures of the defendants. First, they claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by "locking in"
Plan investment options into two investment companies. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 184-95 (hereinafter "Am. Compl.").
Second, they claim that the administrative services and fees were unreasonably high due [*2] to the defendants'
failure to seek competitive bids to decrease administrative costs. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 196-209. Third, they argue that the
fiduciaries charged unnecessary fees while the portfolio underperformed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 210-28. Plaintiffs seek to
certify a class encompassing all participants and beneficiaries of the Plan from August 10, 2010, through the date of
judgment, excluding the defendants. Am. Compl. ¶ 237.
I. Defendants' § 403(b) Program
Defendants' § 403(b) Plan is a defined contribution, individual account, employee pension benefit plan as defined
under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2)(A) and (34) that provides for retirement income benefits for certain employees of the
University of Pennsylvania. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. It is funded through deferrals of employee compensation, employer
contributions, and investment performance, net of fees and expenses. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. At the end of 2014, the Plan
had $3.8 billion in net assets and 21,412 participants, making it among the largest 0.02% of defined contribution plans
in the United States based on total assets. Am. Compl. ¶ 12.
There are generally two main costs associated with investment accounts: plan administration and investment options
management. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Plan administration includes the use of recordkeepers, entities that track the amount
of each participant's investments in various options in the plan. Recordkeepers usually provide participants with
quarterly account statements, a website, call center, and investment education materials. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40-41. A
recordkeeper's fee is often partially covered by "revenue sharing" agreements. In revenue sharing arrangements, a
mutual fund itself (rather than the participant) pays a portion of these expenses. The Plan at issue here operates on a
revenue sharing model. Am. Compl. ¶ 119. The second main cost associated with investment accounts is investment
options management. Investment options differ by offering different share classes. "Retail share" classes are geared
toward small investments, whereas "institutional share" classes are aimed at large investments. Investment
companies hope to persuade large plans to invest in these institutional funds by charging lower fees. Am. Compl. ¶
45. The same way big box chains like Costco arguably can offer savings over the local convenience store by selling in
bulk, institutional shares offer fee savings for bulk investments.
ERISA requires each plan to have one or more named fiduciaries that have the authority to operate and administer the
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) . The Plan at issue here is managed by an investment committee, designated by the
Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania as a named fiduciary, responsible for the "selection, monitoring, and
removal of Plan investment options and providers." Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Jack Heuer as the Vice President of Human
Resources is also a named fiduciary under the plan and designated as the Plan Administrator responsible for "Planrelated matters" including "establishing rules and procedures for the Plan's operation." Am. Compl. ¶ 23.
Employees (the beneficiaries, or participants, of the plan) may opt into [*3] the Plan, but as in all § 403(b) plans, they
are limited in where they can invest. The Plan managers determine the range of options available to the
beneficiaries, who then choose where their money is placed. The University of Pennsylvania, as manager of one of
the largest funds in the country, has a diverse array of beneficiaries to serve, from grounds and cleaning crews to
renowned Wharton School and Law professors, physicists, anthropologists, hockey coaches and endless others.3
These individuals have different goals, risk tolerances, investment acumen and income.
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To make it easier for potential investors, plan managers divided the investment options (which ranged
between 76 and 118 options) into four tiers. Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter "Mot.") Ex. 6.4 Tier 1 is for the "do it for
me" investor; tier 2 is geared toward the "help me do it" investor; tier 3 is designed for the "mix my own" investor; and
tier 4 is built for the "self-directed" investor. Mot. Ex. 6. In each of these plans, options are presented to the
beneficiaries from TIAA-CREF and Vanguard, the two companies used in the Plan. The options range from one option
from each company in the "do it for me" category to complete customization of available options in tier 4. Mot. Ex. 6.
Beneficiaries are informed that each mutual fund's prospectus is available online. Mot. Ex. 3. They are given detailed
statistics on each of the investment options, including 1, 5 and 10 year returns, as well as total operating expenses.
Mot. Ex. 3.
Since 2010, the Plan has offered as many as 118 investment options, and as of December 31, 2014, the Plan offered
78 options. Am. Compl. ¶ 77. Vanguard Group, Inc. manages 48 mutual fund options (totaling $1.3 billion) and TIAACREF manages the other 30 options including mutual funds and fixed and variable annuities (totaling $2.5 billion).
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77, 79. The Plan includes multiple recordkeepers; Vanguard and TIAA-CREF each serve as the
recordkeeper for their respective offerings. Am. Compl. ¶ 78.
II. Plaintiffs' Claims
The Amended Complaint includes seven claims: Breach of fiduciary duties for locking the Plan into the CREF stock
account and TIAA recordkeeping, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1) (Count I); breach of fiduciary duties for
unreasonable administrative fees, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1) (Count III); breach of fiduciary duties for
unreasonable fees in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (Count V); and failure to monitor fiduciaries (Count VII). The
plaintiffs allege that these actions also violate the "prohibited transactions" clause of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)
(Counts II, IV & VI).
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Although Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) , "to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,'" the
plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 , 555 , 127 S. Ct. 1955 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation
omitted) (alteration in original).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows [*4] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 ,
129 S. Ct. 1937 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately
prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.
521 , 530 , 131 S. Ct. 1289 , 179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
assessment of the sufficiency of a complaint is "a context-dependent exercise" because "[s]ome claims require more
factual explication than others to state a plausible claim for relief." W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627
F.3d 85 , 98 (3d Cir. 2010).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain well-recognized parameters. For one, the
Court "must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true." ALA, Inc. v.
CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855 , 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that courts must "assum[e]
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"); Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223 , 230 (3d
Cir. 2010) ("[A] court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as
well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents"). Also, the
Court must accept as true all reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations, and view those facts and
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inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644 , 645
(3d Cir. 1989); see also Revell v. Port Auth., 598 F.3d 128 , 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount reality. The Court "need not accept as true
unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173 ,
183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and "the tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 ; see also
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902 , 906 (3d Cir. 1997) ( explaining that a court need not accept a
plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" (citations omitted)). If a claim "is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a
district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 , 236 (3d Cir. 2008).5
II. Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA
Both sides agree that the defendants are fiduciaries to the plaintiffs under the Plan. ERISA imposes the "prudent man
standard of care." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) . This requires the fiduciary to
(1) . . . discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and—
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity [*5] and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) .
"The fiduciary standard is 'flexible, such that the adequacy of a fiduciary's independent investigation and ultimate
investment selection is evaluated in light of the character and aims of the particular type of plan he serves.'" Renfro,
671 F.3d at 322 (quoting Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp. (In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig .) ( Unisys I ), 74 F.3d 420 , 434 (3d
Cir. 1996)). An ERISA fiduciary acts prudently when it gives "appropriate consideration to those facts and
circumstances that, given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are
relevant to the . . . investment course of action involved . . . ." Renfro, 671 F.3d at 322 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i) ). Accordingly, in evaluating a questioned decision, courts focus upon the fiduciary's "conduct in
arriving at [that] investment decision." Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 434 .
The Supreme Court has "often noted that an ERISA fiduciary's duty is 'derived from the common law of trusts.'" Tibble
v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 , 1828 , 191 L. Ed. 2d 795 (2015) (quoting Central States, Southeast and Southwest
Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport Inc., 472 U.S. 559 , 570 , 105 S. Ct. 2833 , 86 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1985)). "In
administering the trust the trustee may perform or fail to perform an act that results in loss to the trust beneficiaries. He
is only liable when his conduct causing the loss failed to conform to the standard of care and skill applicable to
trustees in the administration of trusts." GEORGE BOGERT ET AL, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541, (3d
ed. 2009) (June 2017 Update).
"A determination of what is due care or appropriate skill depends upon the circumstances of time and place as they
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appeared at the time the trustee took the action in question[, but t]here is no fixed formula which enables the court to
determine what is due care under all circumstances." Id. In evaluating the effectiveness of an ERISA fiduciary's
obligations, "the range of investment options and the characteristics of those included options—including the risk
profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees—are highly relevant" factors. Renfro, 671 F.3d at 327 . The
touchstone of an effective ERISA defined contribution plan is if it "offer[s] participants meaningful choices about how to
invest their retirement savings." Id. Such a duty to offer choice is more pronounced in plans as large as Penn's, which
serves a broad array of needs and desires.
III. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims (Counts I, III, & V)
The issues in this case primarily rise and fall with the inquiry of whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to
the plaintiffs, and such an inquiry must begin with Renfro.
A. Renfro v. Unisys Corp.
In Renfro v. Unisys Corp., retirement savings plan participants filed a putative class action against their employer for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011). The breach of duty alleged in Renfro was similar
to the case at hand. The putative class challenged "the selection and periodic evaluation of the Unisys defined
contribution plan's mix and range of investment options" in a § 401(k) plan. Id. at 325-26. In upholding the dismissal of
the claim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that courts must look to the "mix [*6] and range of options and . . .
evaluate[] the plausibility of claims challenging fund selection against the backdrop of the reasonableness of the mix
and range of investment options." Id. at 326. Under that framework, the Court concluded that in light of the available
options—which included 73 investments with fees ranging from 0.10% to 1.21%—plaintiffs had "provided nothing
more than conclusory assertions" of fiduciary breach and affirmed dismissal of the case. Id. at 327-28. This standard
stops plan participants from second-guessing a plan fiduciary's investment decisions just because they lose money,
while allowing plan participants latitude to bring suit for improper management. It requires plaintiffs to show more than
just a single sub-optimality in a given mutual fund. Instead, they must show systemic mismanagement such that
individuals are presented with a Hobson's choice between a poorly-performing § 401(k) portfolio or no §401(k) at all.
This still allows multiple avenues for plaintiffs to challenge a breach of fiduciary duty. A plaintiff can allege an
inadequate "mix and range of options" by alleging insufficient choice, that all (or the vast majority of) options breach
the fiduciary duty, an insufficient variety among the range of options, or a kickback scheme where the fiduciaries
directly benefit at the expense of plan participants. See Renfro, 671 F.3d 314 (insufficient mix and range; lack of
options); Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009) (assuming insufficient variety among investment
vehicles gives rise to a claim); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) (endorsed by the Renfro
court for its denial of dismissal due to allegations of a kickback scheme). At the same time, it effectively discharges
Congress' "careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair" administration "against the public interest in encouraging
the formation of employee benefit plans." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 42 , 107 S. Ct. 1549 , 95 L. Ed.
2d 39 (1987).
B. The Renfro Standard and § 403(b)
At issue in this case are § 403(b) tax plans, the non-profit analogue to the far more common § 401(k) tax retirement
plans used by private companies. Renfro and other similar cases have dealt with a § 401(k) retirement plan, while the
Plan here is a § 403(b) tax advantaged retirement plan. While § 401(k) and § 403(b) plans have different historical
roots and historical structures that demand different fiduciary duties for administrators, those differences have largely
eroded over time. Today, the obligation of beneficiaries and fiduciaries in § 401(k) and § 403(b) plans are nearly
identical.
ERISA was enacted in 1974 as "the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans" became "rapid
and substantial," necessitating federal intervention to create a comprehensive enforcement mechanism. 29 U.S.C. §
1001(a) . As retirement systems began to take shape in America in the late 1800s, there were few protections for
employees. "There was no federal law applicable to such plans, and under state law, such plans were generally
regarded as nonbinding expressions of the employers' present intent to make a future gift to aged employees."
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American Bar Administration, [*7] Employee Benefits Law 1-1 (3rd Ed. 2012).
The modern-day understanding of retirement plans did not begin to take shape until the income tax legislation was
enacted in 1913, forcing the government to give special status to pension plans in the Revenue Acts of 1921 and
1926. Id. at 1-4. This special status led to patchwork legislation about how the plans could be used and administered.
Id. at 1-5. The economic boom of post-war America created a dramatic rise in retirement plans. Id. at 1-8. Employee
benefits plans increased in size and scope as states tried to keep pace by passing their own regulations. As
companies and unions operated increasingly across state lines, they were forced to "deal with different and
sometimes inconsistent state laws." Id.
By the 1960s, a national consensus arguably formed that retirement funds needed comprehensive regulation. Id. at
1-9. As the "inadequacy of current minimum standards" became apparent, concerns arose that "the soundness and
stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) .
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to provide a comprehensive mechanism for
regulating nationwide tax-advantaged retirement plans. Employee Benefits Law at 2-2. "ERISA's detailed provisions
set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and
fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans."
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 42 .
Despite the uniform language of ERISA, coverage "of a plan under ERISA (i.e., the labor provisions) is unrelated to
the tax status of that plan under the Code." EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW at 2-5. This is because tax advantaged
retirement plans are created and administered through the IRS under a different (more dynamic) chapter of the U.S.
Code than the one that created ERISA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (ERISA) with 26 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (tax).
Over the years, Congress has amended Chapter 26 (and the IRS has supplemented it with regulations) such that the
tax-advantaged retirement plans we know today are a far cry from those in place when ERISA was enacted. See, e.g.,
26 C.F.R. §§ 1, 31, 54 (2007) (promulgating rules under the IRS regarding § 403(b) plans).
Initially, § 403(b) and § 401(k) plans differed dramatically in both scope and structure. Section 403(b) plans initially
were limited to annuity contracts (which function like a pension, paying a fixed amount for the remainder of the
person's lifetime) and pre-dated § 401(k) plans by nearly 20 years. See, e.g., Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-866 , § 23, 72 Stat 1606 (1958) (outlining the requirements for tax advantaged § 403(b) accounts).
While still governed by ERISA, these salient differences resulted in different management and fiduciary requirements,
since the duties by a fiduciary to an annuity contract differs dramatically from the duties of a fiduciary managing
mutual funds. Over the years, § 403(b) plans have moved away from annuity offerings to offer a range of options that
are nearly identical to those offered by § 401(k) plans, such as the plan [*8] at issue here. Today, the fiduciary
requirements by § 403(b) plan administrators are nearly identical to those requirements for § 401(k) administrators,
especially with respect to their duties to plan beneficiaries.
ERISA's fiduciary duty standard does not differentiate between § 403(b) and § 401(k) plans. Rather, it defines a
blanket fiduciary duty standard. ERISA "aims 'to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans' in
order to ease administrative burdens and reduce employers' costs." Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola , 700 F.3d 65 , 82 (3d
Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 , 208 , 124 S. Ct. 2488 , 159 L. Ed. 2d
312 (2004)). Because of the modern-day similarity between the two retirement plans and the historical roots of
ERISA's goal to create a uniform regulatory system for retirement plans, the analysis of the fiduciary standards for §
403(b) and § 401(k) retirement plans must be the same. The Renfro reasoning (and other interpretations of § 401(k)
cases) therefore serve as a guiding light for analyzing the different theories advanced by the plaintiffs.
C. Claim I: Locking the Plan into CREF Stock Accounts and TIAA Recordkeeping
The plaintiff's first claim is that by "allowing TIAA-CREF to mandate the inclusion of the CREF Stock Account and
Money Market Account in the Plan" the defendants committed the plan to an "imprudent arrangement in which certain
investments had to be included and could not be removed from the plan" even if the investments underperformed. Am.
Compl. ¶ 187. In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs point to recent Supreme Court dicta in Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S.
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Ct. 1823 , 1829 , 191 L. Ed. 2d 795 (2015). There, the Court noted (while addressing a statute of limitations question)
that "under trust law, a fiduciary normally has a continuing duty of some kind to monitor investments and remove
imprudent ones." Id. at 1828-29. However, the Court "express[ed] no view on the scope of respondents' fiduciary duty"
and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1829.
Such a quibble over Tibble's applicability misses the fact that, even assuming the dicta is binding, the plaintiffs'
complaint here fails to allege conduct that violates the Tibble principle. The only fact that the plaintiffs have pled is that
the defendants "locked in" the Plan to TIAA CREF. Am. Compl. ¶ 187. This, standing alone, is insufficient to create a
plausible inference that this was a breach of fiduciary duty. Locking in rates and plans is a common practice used
across the business and personal world. Companies often offer better terms to induce customers to "lock in" for a
longer period. Cable companies offer discounts for signing a two-year contract, landlords offer cheaper rates for
longer leases, and cell phone companies give free phones for signing a two-year agreement. Often times, locking in a
plan for a stated period is better for all sides because customers save money with the discount offered by the
company, and companies save money by eliminating the costs associated with customer acquisition while having an
arguably reliable income stream to rely on.
The plaintiffs' claim that this violates the defendants' fiduciary [*9] duty does not meet the plausibility threshold. As in
Twombly, the actions are at least "just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy"
in the market as they are with a fiduciary breach. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 , 554 , 127 S. Ct. 1955 , 167
L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).6
D. Claim III: Unreasonable Administrative Fees
Plaintiffs next claim that Defendants allowed TIAA-CREF and Vanguard to charge unreasonable administrative fees in
two ways: First, allowing TIAA-CREF and Vanguard to operate as their own recordkeepers (rather than consolidating
all funds with a singular third-party recordkeeper) supposedly increased fees. Am. Compl. ¶ 107. Second, Plaintiffs
claim that the plan administrators should have arranged a flat per-person fee rather than an "asset-based" fee. Am.
Compl. ¶ 99.
1. Multiple Recordkeepers
The argument that TIAA-CREF and Vanguard operated as their own recordkeepers fails in the face of the same
realities discussed above. Bundling of services is not inconsistent with lawful, free market behavior in the best
interests of those involved, including beneficiaries. Companies, for example, often "bundle" phone service in with the
more popular cable and internet services, even when the users do not want a land line. In those instances, it is still a
rational self-interested action to purchase the bundle because the other equipment is worth the price for the
consumer, even with the unnecessary or undesired product or fee. Here, it is rational to comply with Vanguard's
requirement that they serve as recordkeeper if that is required to gain access to the desired Vanguard portfolio. Just
as the actions in Twombly were "consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational"
actions, so too are the actions here—perhaps consistent with fiduciary breach, but also well in line with a wide swath
of other rational actions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 .
But even if this were not true, the argument also fails as a factual matter because there is a reasonable "range of
investment options with a variety of risk profiles and fee rates." Renfro, 671 F.3d at 327 . Here, the fees range from
0.04% to 0.87%, markedly lower than the 0.10% to 1.21% at issue in Renfro. Mot. at 11-12. The plan offered 17
investment options with fees lower than the lowest fees in Renfro (0.10%) and only one plan above 0.57%. Mot. at 12.
With such low fees, it is not inevitable to say that recordkeeping fees were unnecessarily high, especially when there
are rational bundling reasons to allow separate recordkeepers. Even if there were cheaper options available for
recordkeeping fees, ERISA mandates that fiduciaries consider options besides cost. Fiduciaries must balance
"providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries" and "defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) . Without plausibly pleading that these two options were not met, a plaintiff cannot state
a claim for relief.
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2. Asset-Based v. Flat Fee Charges
The plaintiffs next claim that the plan administrators breached their fiduciary duty by allowing recordkeepers to charge
"excessive asset-based" fees rather than cheaper " [*10] per-participant fees." Am. Compl. ¶ 108.
This is a pure question of where the burden of recordkeeping costs should be placed—a question open to the
discretion of a reasonable plan administrator. In flat per-participant fee systems, the burden is disproportionately
placed on the lower income and lower investment individuals to subsidize higher income individuals. In the assetbased model, individuals must pay a pro rata share based on their investments, placing the burden disproportionately
on the higher income individuals. For example, in a flat fee system, a young individual with only a $10,000 balance
would pay the same as an older individual who has invested longer with a $100,000 balance. If there is a flat fee of
$44, both parties would pay the same price, but a different percentage of their total account: the young investor would
pay 0.44% of her account balance, while the older investor would pay 0.044% of the account balance. However, if
there is a fee of 0.08% of asset value, the young investor pays only $8, while the older investor pays $80. In both
instances, the fees collected by the recordkeeper are the same but collected differently among plan beneficiaries.
The plan administrators are fiduciaries to every plan member, whether she invests $10 or $10 million. It is not up to
courts to second-guess how fiduciaries allocate that cost, only that the fiduciary "discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" as a whole. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) . To the extent that
this argument claims the arrangement increased fees, it fails on the same reasoning as above: there are lawful
explanations for such an arrangement, and the plaintiffs need something more than a claim that there may be (or even
are) cheaper options available. The plaintiffs must show that there were no reasonable alternatives given to plan
participants to choose from, which the plaintiffs have not pled. Cf. Renfro, 671 F.3d at 329 (holding that affording a
reasonable mix of plan options to participants was sufficient to meet the fiduciary standard).
E. Claim V: Unreasonable Investment Management Fees; Unnecessary Marketing, Distribution, Mortality and
Expense Risk Fees; and Performance Losses
The plaintiffs next claim a litany of costly measures that they claim amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, including
unnecessary fees, duplicative investments, retention of higher cost funds, retention of underperforming funds, and
poor performance relative to the market. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 210-23. These claims broadly break down into three
categories: (1) unnecessary fees, (2) participant confusion, and (3) poor market performance.
1. Unnecessary fees
A variant on the argument above (that a necessary fee arrangement could have been cheaper) the plaintiffs also point
to a number of charged fees that they claim were unnecessary or duplicative. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 211-23. The
majority of these "excessive fee" arguments fail to state a claim because the mix and range of fee options included
fees as low as 0.04%, which neither side claims is excessive. The strongest argument advanced [*11] by the plaintiffs
is that the plan contained "retail class" shares, rather than other identical options with lower fees, known as
"institutional class" shares. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 121-30. Retail shares are generally available to regular market participants
who have small investments, while institutional shares are only available to larger institutions with more bargaining
power and larger capital pools. Am. Compl. ¶ 121; Mot. at 16-18.
The plaintiffs overstate their argument. While some shares in the Plan are retail shares that could be replaced with
institutional shares, nearly half of the shares (37 of 78) are already these lower-fee funds. Mot. Ex. 3. The plaintiffs'
argument also ignores that these institutional class shares would only be available if significantly more money were
funneled into each of them.7 Switching from retail to institutional shares is not a matter of checking a different box. It
requires fiduciaries to balance the menu of options given to plan beneficiaries against the fees. Sometimes,
institutional shares are unavailable as an option because investment levels are too low in that fund. But these
"institutional investment vehicles [also] come with a drawback: lower liquidity." Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667 ,
672 (7th Cir. 2011). While retail funds allow daily transfers, where participants can withdraw money without fees,
"[i]nstitutional trusts and pools do not offer that choice." Id.
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The plaintiffs' argument that fiduciaries must maintain a myopic focus on the singular goal of lower fees was soundly
rejected in Renfro . 671 F.3d at 327. ERISA requires fiduciaries to balance "providing benefits to participants" with
"defraying reasonable expenses" in the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) . The plaintiffs here have not pled that these
reductions in expenses could be achieved without changing the variety of benefits to participants. These same
considerations motivated the Seventh Circuit's rejection of identical "institutional versus retail" arguments. Loomis, 658
F.3d at 671-72 ; Hecker , 556 F.3d at 580-81 . Plaintiffs have only pled that the failure to replace these shares was a
breach of fiduciary duty, which is insufficient to pass through the 12(b)(6) threshold.
2. Participant Confusion
The plaintiffs next allege that defendants "provided a dizzying array of duplicative funds in the same investment style"
leading to "'decision paralysis' for participants." Am. Compl. ¶ 132. This assertion is unsupported by the pleading. The
plaintiffs have not alleged any participant who was confused by the different options, an omission that on its own
causes the amended complaint to fail to state a factual basis for the claim. Moreover, the plan administrators broke
the options down into four categories based on the participants' investment acumen to help guide them. See generally
Mot. Ex. 6. Offering 78 different choices is not an unreasonably high number, especially with the tiered descriptive
guidance given to participants. As a practical matter, plan administrators must offer a sufficient amount of choice to
participants, while not overwhelming them to the point participants cannot actually [*12] choose. Providing 78 different
investment options satisfies the "reasonable mix and range of investment options" required by Renfro without being
unduly overwhelming. 671 F.3d at 327 .
The plaintiffs' derivative claim, namely that offering duplicative funds was unnecessary, fails as well. On the contrary,
duplicative investment options are necessary based on the structure of the Plan. Each of the four tiers becomes
progressively more complex for plan participants. The "do it for me" tier (tier 1) has only one option from each of the
two providers, but had a number of different underlying mutual funds or annuities in its umbrella. Mot. Ex. 6. In
contrast, the "self-directed" plan (tier 4) allowed complete customization by participants. Mot. Ex. 6. That these tiers
contained some of the same funds is unsurprising and raises no plausible inference of a breach of fiduciary duty.
Indeed, if there was no overlap there could be greater cause for criticism or frustration.
3. Poor Market Performance
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that select funds were outperformed by the rest of the market, claiming that 60% of the
Plan's investment options "underperformed their respective benchmarks over the previous 5-year period." Am. Compl.
¶ 151. To begin, there is no cause of action in ERISA for "underperforming funds." The statutory text requires
fiduciaries to discharge their duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing" when they make decisions. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) . (emphasis added). This standard requires courts to
look at the actions taken by the fiduciary at the time that they took those actions. See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746
F.3d 327 , 338 (8th Cir. 2014) ("While it is easy to pick an investment option in retrospect (buy Apple Inc. at $7 a share
in December 2000 and short Enron Corp. at $90 a share), selecting an investment beforehand is difficult. The Plan
administrator deserves discretion to the extent its ex ante investment choices were reasonable given what it knew at
the time"). Sophisticated investors and rank amateurs both look to buy low and sell high and wonder why they did not
have clear enough vision to see the path for doing so early enough to make their fortunes. Chagrin does not
inexorably become a cause of action.
Moreover, when examined closely, the plaintiffs' claims do not withstand scrutiny. A statistical sampling of funds would
expect (all things being equal) half of the funds to be above benchmarks and half to be below benchmarks. Here, as
opposed to what the simplistic statistical average would show, that 38 (half) of the 76 funds underperformed, the
plaintiffs pled that 45 investment options performed below benchmarks. Am. Compl. ¶ 151. Such a post hoc analysis
of market performance, where only 7 more funds underperformed than would be expected, may be consistent with a
breach of fiduciary duty, but does not show that the plaintiffs have "nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible" and "their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 .
IV. Prohibited Transaction Claims
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Plaintiffs recast the same arguments above as violating the [*13] prohibited transactions clause of ERISA, § 1106 (a).8
This clause states that:
[A] fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or
should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect (A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the plan and a party in interest . . .
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of a party in interest, of any assets of the plan . . .
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)
This prohibited transaction requirement in ERISA imposes an additional duty on fiduciaries not to engage in deals
using the plan assets and a "party in interest." A party in interest is defined as, inter alia, "a person providing services
to such plan" 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B) . The prohibited transactions provision supplements the "foundational [fiduciary]
obligation" by prohibiting "plan fiduciaries from entering into certain transactions. Subsection (a) erects a categorical
bar to transactions between the plan and a 'party in interest' deemed likely to injure the plan." Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc. v.
Iola, 700 F.3d 65 , 82 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270 , 275 (3d Cir.1995).
Congress adopted the prohibited transactions provision of ERISA "to prevent plans from engaging in certain types of
transactions that had been used in the past to benefit other parties at the expense of the plans' participants and
beneficiaries." Reich, 57 F.3d at 275 (quoting Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keystone Consolidated Indus.,
508 U.S. 152 , 160 , 113 S. Ct. 2006 , 124 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1993)). In the decades before ERISA, plans could "engage in
transactions with related parties so long as the transactions were 'arms-length.' Unfortunately, this rule was difficult to
police and thus 'provided an open door for abuses' by plan trustees." Id. Congress amended ERISA "with the goal of
creating a categorical bar to certain types of transactions that were regarded as likely to injure a plan." Reich, 57 F.3d
at 275 .9
The plaintiffs seek recovery under this section of ERISA under the theory that the contractual arrangement with TIAACREF and Vanguard constituted a prohibited transaction. This cannot be correct. Plaintiffs argue that paying these
companies constitutes a sale of property under § 1106(a)(1)(A), a furnishing of services under § 1106(a)(1)(C), and a
transfer of assets in the plan under § 1106(a)(1)(D). If such an argument were true, then any time plan administrators
contracted with another party to provide services to plan participants in exchange for money (which includes the basic
elements of retirement plans, including making mutual funds available or recordkeeping services) it would qualify as a
prohibited transaction. After all, fees charged by these companies necessarily requires "transfer of assets." Plaintiffs
claim this all while maintaining that there are no per se ERISA violations in the revenue sharing arrangement. See
generally, Am. Compl.; See also, Opp. at 34.
Perhaps Plaintiffs attempt to balance on such an analytical tightrope because they cite no court that has been
persuaded by such a novel argument. Moreover, the transactions at issue here were not done "to benefit other parties
[*14] at the expense of the plans' participants and beneficiaries" but were simply operating expenses necessary to
operate the plan on behalf of the plan beneficiaries. Reich, 57 F.3d at 275 . While a kickback scheme such as that in
Braden, where the fiduciaries are benefitting by engaging in these transactions, may be actionable under the
prohibited transactions provision, the plaintiffs must plead that there is a "subjective intent to benefit a party in
interest." Id. at 279. They have not done so here. The plaintiffs' attempts to shoehorn their fiduciary duty claims into
the prohibited transaction provision simply fail as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted. Counts I through VII of the complaint are dismissed
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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gene E.K. Pratter
GENE E.K. PRATTER
United States District Judge

ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of September, 2017, upon consideration Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim (Doc. No. 33), responses thereto, oral argument, and supplemental briefing, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Motion (Doc. No. 33) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall mark this case CLOSED for all purposes, including
statistics.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gene E.K. Pratter
GENE E.K. PRATTER
United States District Judge
fn 1
Count VII is styled as "failure to monitor fiduciaries" in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) . Given that the plaintiffs
did not press this argument in their briefings, or dispute the defense contention that this was simply duplicative of
the breach of fiduciary duty claims, Count VII will be treated as incorporated into Counts I, III, and V.
fn 2
In a motion to dismiss, the Court "must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the
allegations as true." ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855 , 859 (3d Cir. 1994). The facts discussed in this
Memorandum are taken as true from the complaint and documents referenced within the complaint.
fn 3
Of course, the Court does not hazard a guess about the investment acumen or even instincts for "a good deal" of
anyone on any campus—or Court for that matter—anywhere.
fn 4
Plaintiffs argue that this exhibit cannot properly be considered at this stage of the proceeding.
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 36 (hereinafterOpp.) at 13 n.12. A "court may
consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guar Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. , 998 F.2d 1192 ,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs do not dispute the authenticity of any exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss, only
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that they are not referenced in the complaint. Exhibit 6 (the array of options given to plan participants) was
incorporated by reference in the Amended Complaint, and therefore can properly be considered. See Am. Compl.
¶ 132 ("Defendants provided a dizzying array of duplicative funds in the same investment style" to participants
causing "decision paralysis").
fn 5
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on August 8, 2016 (Doc. No. 1). Following the defense's initial motion to dismiss on
October 28, 2016 (Doc. No. 25), Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 21, 2016 (Doc. No. 27).
Defendants filed a new motion to dismiss on January 5, 2017 (Doc. No. 33) and that motion is the subject of this
memorandum. The parties took the offered opportunities for oral argument and supplemental briefing.
fn 6
This Count fails to meet the requirements under Rule 12(b)(6), so the Court need not address the question of
whether the claim is time-barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1) .
fn 7
For example, the Vanguard Institutional Index Fund Institutional Shares require a $5 million minimum investment.
Vanguard, VINIX Share Mutual Fund Profile (2017).
fn 8
Defendants also claim that the prohibited transaction claims are time-barred. Mot. at 30. Because the "prohibited
transaction" claims fail to state a claim, the Court offers no opinion as to whether the claims were timely.
fn 9
The Senate Report leading to the amendment to ERISA provided a (non-exhaustive) list of examples of the
prohibited transactions the provision sought to stop: "lending funds without adequate security and a reasonable
rate of interest to the creator of the plan, his family, or corporations controlled by him . . . payment of excessive
salaries, purchase of property for more than an adequate consideration, sale of property for less than an adequate
consideration, or any other transactions which result in a substantial diversion of funds to such individuals." S.Rep.
No. 93-383 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4903.
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Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 16-4329, 2017 BL 334297, 2017
EBC 334297 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017), Court Opinion

Direct History
1

Direct History Summary

Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 16-4329, 2017 BL
334297, 2017 EBC 334297 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21,
2017)
motion to dismiss granted, case dismissed

Case Analysis ( 4 cases )
1

Cited in , (See)

Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3:16cv-02086, 2018 BL 4604, 2018 EBC 4604
(M.D. Tenn. Jan. 05, 2018)

Having too many options does not hurt Plan participants. Instead, it provides
them with greater opportunities to choose the investments they prefer.
Henderson , 252 F. Supp.3d at 1350 . ERISA encourages plan sponsors
to allow more choices to participants and to allow participants to make their
own choices. Loomis v. Exelon Corp. , 658 F.3d 667 , 673 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, there is no allegation of any specific harm to any specific person
caused simply by the number of options available in the Plan. For these
reasons, therefore, the claim that having too many options was a breach of
the fiduciary duty of prudence will be dismissed. See Sweda v. Univ. of Pa.
, [ 2017 BL 334297 ], 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958 , [ 2017 BL 334297 ],
2017 WL 4179752 at * 9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017).
...

2

Discussed in

Nicolas v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. Civ.
No. 17-3695, 2017 BL 455755 (D.N.J. Dec.
19, 2017)

Caution

0

Negative

0

Total

0

Case Analysis Summary
Positive

4

Distinguished

0

Caution

0

Superseded

0

Negative

0

Total

4

Authorities Summary
Positive

25

Distinguished

0

Caution

0

Superseded

0

Negative

0

Total

25

On August 7, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No 7.) On September 19, the Court granted in part and
denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment
(ECF Nos. 10, 11), filing an Amended Opinion on September 25, 2017 (ECF
No. 14). The Amended Opinion dismissed Counts I—II of Plaintiff's Complaint
with respect to the duty of loyalty and dismissed Count III of Plaintiff's
Complaint in its entirety, granting Plaintiff leave to amend on all Counts.
(Am. Op. at 4-10, ECF No. 14.) It also denied Defendant's alternative Motion
for Summary Judgment on statute of limitations grounds. ( Id. at 10-12
.) With Court approval, the parties agreed to a revised briefing schedule
for Defendant to file a motion for reconsideration and for Plaintiff to file an
Amended Complaint. ( See ECF Nos. 15, 17, 18.) On October 31, 2017,
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Case Analysis ( 4 cases )
Defendant timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration according to the courtapproved schedule. (ECF No. 20.) Defendant simultaneously filed a Motion
to Stay, in view of the docketed appeal to the Third Circuit in the similar but
unrelated matter of Sweda v. University of Pennsylvania , [ 2017 BL 334297
], 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958 , [ 2017 BL 334297 ], 2017 WL 4179752
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017), appeal filed , No. 17-3244 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2017).
(ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff opposes both motions. (ECF Nos. 25, 26.) Defendant
replied to Plaintiff's opposition to the Motion to Stay on November 27, 2017.
(ECF No. 27.) The Court now considers the Motion to Stay, followed by the
Motion for Reconsideration.
...
..

Defendant has brought to the Court's attention an appeal pending before
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Sweda v. University of Pennsylvania ,
[ 2017 BL 334297 ], 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958 , [ 2017 BL 334297 ],
2017 WL 4179752 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017), appeal filed , No. 17-3244 (3d
Cir. Oct. 13, 2017). In that case, a plaintiff brought a putative class action
claiming fiduciary breaches of ERISA by the University of Pennsylvania, on
the basis of substantially overlapping factual allegations as those alleged
by Plaintiff here. ( See Def. Br. for Stay at 3-7, ECF No. 21-1.) Two days
after this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 10), Judge Gene E.K. Pratter of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the University of Pennsylvania's motion to dismiss
on all claims, finding that Sweda's complaint failed to create a plausible
inference of fiduciary breach sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Sweda
, [ 2017 BL 334297 ], 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958 , [ 2017 BL 334297
], 2017 WL 4179752 , at *7-10; ( see also Def.'s Br. for Stay at 7). Sweda
appealed. Defendant seeks a stay of this action until that appeal is decided,
asserting that the ERISA claims against each university defendant are
strikingly similar and disposition of the appeal will clarify the controlling law,
conserve judicial resources, and be highly instructive in this action going
forward. (Def.'s Br. for Stay at 3-7, 9-10.)
...
..

ORDERED that this case is hereby stayed until the Third Circuit's disposition
of the pending appeal in Sweda v. University of Pennsylvania , [ 2017 BL
334297 ], 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958 , [ 2017 BL 334297 ], 2017 WL
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Case Analysis ( 4 cases )
4179752 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017), appeal filed , No. 17-3244 (3d Cir. Oct.
13, 2017); and it is further
...

3

Discussed in , (But
see) , Quoted

Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 16-cv-6525
(PKC), 2017 BL 350951, 2017 EBC 350951
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017)

4

Cited in , (See)

Kelly v. The Johns Hopkins Univ., No.
GLR-16-2835, 2017 BL 348010, 2017 EBC
348010 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2017)

Table Of Authorities ( 25 cases )
1

Discussed , Quoted

Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 191 L.
Ed. 2d 795, 59 EBC 2461, 83 U.S.L.W. 4300
(2015)

The Supreme Court has "often noted that an ERISA fiduciary's duty is
'derived from the common law of trusts.'" Tibble v. Edison Int'l , 135 S.
Ct. 1823 , 1828 , 191 L. Ed. 2d 795 (2015) (quoting Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport Inc.
, 472 U.S. 559 , 570 , 105 S. Ct. 2833 , 86 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1985)). "In
administering the trust the trustee may perform or fail to perform an act that
results in loss to the trust beneficiaries. He is only liable when his conduct
causing the loss failed to conform to the standard of care and skill applicable
to trustees in the administration of trusts." GEORGE BOGERT ET AL, LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541, (3d ed. 2009) (June 2017 Update).
...
..

The plaintiff's first claim is that by "allowing TIAA-CREF to mandate the
inclusion of the CREF Stock Account and Money Market Account in the Plan"
the defendants committed the plan to an "imprudent arrangement in which
certain investments had to be included and could not be removed from the
plan" even if the investments underperformed. Am. Compl. ¶ 187. In support
of this assertion, Plaintiffs point to recent Supreme Court dicta in Tibble v.
Edison Int'l , 135 S. Ct. 1823 , 1829 , 191 L. Ed. 2d 795 (2015). There,
the Court noted (while addressing a statute of limitations question) that
"under trust law, a fiduciary normally has a continuing duty of some kind to
monitor investments and remove imprudent ones." Id. at 1828-29. However,
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the Court "express[ed] no view on the scope of respondents' fiduciary duty"
and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1829.
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2

Cited , (See, e.g.) ,
Quoted

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 58 EBC
1085 (8th Cir. 2014)

Finally, the plaintiffs claim that select funds were outperformed by the
rest of the market, claiming that 60% of the Plan's investment options
"underperformed their respective benchmarks over the previous 5-year
period." Am. Compl. ¶ 151. To begin, there is no cause of action in ERISA
for "underperforming funds." The statutory text requires fiduciaries to
discharge their duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing " when they make decisions. 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(B) . (emphasis added). This standard requires courts to look at
the actions taken by the fiduciary at the time that they took those actions.
See , e.g. , Tussey v. ABB, Inc. , 746 F.3d 327 , 338 (8th Cir. 2014)
("While it is easy to pick an investment option in retrospect (buy Apple Inc.
at $7 a share in December 2000 and short Enron Corp. at $90 a share),
selecting an investment beforehand is difficult. The Plan administrator
deserves discretion to the extent its ex ante investment choices were
reasonable given what it knew at the time"). Sophisticated investors and rank
amateurs both look to buy low and sell high and wonder why they did not
have clear enough vision to see the path for doing so early enough to make
their fortunes. Chagrin does not inexorably become a cause of action.
...

3

Cited , Quoted

Nat'l. Sec. Sys.,Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 55
EBC 2299 (3d Cir. 2012)

ERISA's fiduciary duty standard does not differentiate between § 403(b) and
§ 401(k) plans. Rather, it defines a blanket fiduciary duty standard. ERISA
"aims 'to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans '
in order to ease administrative burdens and reduce employers' costs." Nat'l
Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola , 700 F.3d 65 , 82 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)
(quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila , 542 U.S. 200 , 208 , 124 S. Ct. 2488
, 159 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2004)). Because of the modern-day similarity between
the two retirement plans and the historical roots of ERISA's goal to create a
uniform regulatory system for retirement plans, the analysis of the fiduciary
standards for § 403(b) and § 401(k) retirement plans must be the same. The
Renfro reasoning (and other interpretations of § 401(k) cases) therefore
serve as a guiding light for analyzing the different theories advanced by the
plaintiffs.
...
..
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This prohibited transaction requirement in ERISA imposes an additional duty
on fiduciaries not to engage in deals using the plan assets and a "party in
interest." A party in interest is defined as, inter alia , "a person providing
services to such plan" 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B) . The prohibited transactions
provision supplements the "foundational [fiduciary] obligation" by prohibiting
"plan fiduciaries from entering into certain transactions. Subsection (a) erects
a categorical bar to transactions between the plan and a 'party in interest'
deemed likely to injure the plan." Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola , 700 F.3d 65
, 82 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Reich v. Compton , 57 F.3d 270 , 275 (3d
Cir.1995).
...

4

Cited , Quoted

Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667, 51
EBC 1705 (7th Cir. 2011)

The plaintiffs overstate their argument. While some shares in the Plan are
retail shares that could be replaced with institutional shares, nearly half of
the shares (37 of 78) are already these lower-fee funds. Mot. Ex. 3. The
plaintiffs' argument also ignores that these institutional class shares would
only be available if significantly more money were funneled into each of them.
7 Switching from retail to institutional shares is not a matter of checking a
different box. It requires fiduciaries to balance the menu of options given
to plan beneficiaries against the fees. Sometimes, institutional shares are
unavailable as an option because investment levels are too low in that fund.
But these "institutional investment vehicles [also] come with a drawback:
lower liquidity." Loomis v. Exelon Corp. , 658 F.3d 667 , 672 (7th Cir.
2011). While retail funds allow daily transfers, where participants can
withdraw money without fees, "[i]nstitutional trusts and pools do not offer that
choice." Id.
...
..

The plaintiffs' argument that fiduciaries must maintain a myopic focus on the
singular goal of lower fees was soundly rejected in Renfro . 671 F.3d at
327. ERISA requires fiduciaries to balance "providing benefits to participants"
with "defraying reasonable expenses" in the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)
(A) . The plaintiffs here have not pled that these reductions in expenses
could be achieved without changing the variety of benefits to participants.
These same considerations motivated the Seventh Circuit's rejection of
identical "institutional versus retail" arguments. Loomis , 658 F.3d at 671-72
; Hecker , 556 F.3d at 580-81 . Plaintiffs have only pled that the failure to
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replace these shares was a breach of fiduciary duty, which is insufficient to
pass through the 12(b)(6) threshold.
...

5

Discussed , Quoted

Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 51
EBC 1609 (3d Cir. 2011)

The Penn parties urge dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Renfro v. Unisys Corp. , 671 F.3d 314
(3d Cir. 2011), controls and demands dismissal of the breach of fiduciary
duties claims (Counts I, III, and V), and that the prohibited transaction claims
(Counts II, IV, and VI) are duplicative of the breach claims. For the following
reasons, the Court grants the motion as to all counts.
...
..

"The fiduciary standard is 'flexible, such that the adequacy of a fiduciary's
independent investigation and ultimate investment selection is evaluated
in light of the character and aims of the particular type of plan he serves.'"
Renfro , 671 F.3d at 322 (quoting Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp. (In re Unisys
Sav. Plan Litig .) ( Unisys I ), 74 F.3d 420 , 434 (3d Cir. 1996)). An
ERISA fiduciary acts prudently when it gives "appropriate consideration
to those facts and circumstances that, given the scope of such fiduciary's
investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the . . .
investment course of action involved . . . ." Renfro , 671 F.3d at 322
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i) ). Accordingly, in evaluating a
questioned decision, courts focus upon the fiduciary's "conduct in arriving at
[that] investment decision." Unisys I , 74 F.3d at 434 .
...
..

"A determination of what is due care or appropriate skill depends upon the
circumstances of time and place as they appeared at the time the trustee
took the action in question[, but t]here is no fixed formula which enables
the court to determine what is due care under all circumstances." Id. In
evaluating the effectiveness of an ERISA fiduciary's obligations, "the range
of investment options and the characteristics of those included options—
including the risk profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees—
are highly relevant" factors. Renfro , 671 F.3d at 327 . The touchstone
of an effective ERISA defined contribution plan is if it "offer[s] participants
meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings." Id. Such
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a duty to offer choice is more pronounced in plans as large as Penn's, which
serves a broad array of needs and desires.
...
..

This still allows multiple avenues for plaintiffs to challenge a breach of
fiduciary duty. A plaintiff can allege an inadequate "mix and range of options"
by alleging insufficient choice, that all (or the vast majority of) options breach
the fiduciary duty, an insufficient variety among the range of options, or a
kickback scheme where the fiduciaries directly benefit at the expense of
plan participants. See Renfro , 671 F.3d 314 (insufficient mix and range;
lack of options); Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009)
(assuming insufficient variety among investment vehicles gives rise to a
claim); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009)
(endorsed by the Renfro court for its denial of dismissal due to allegations
of a kickback scheme). At the same time, it effectively discharges Congress'
"careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair" administration "against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41 , 42 , 107 S. Ct. 1549 , 95 L. Ed.
2d 39 (1987).
...
..

But even if this were not true, the argument also fails as a factual matter
because there is a reasonable "range of investment options with a variety
of risk profiles and fee rates." Renfro , 671 F.3d at 327 . Here, the fees
range from 0.04% to 0.87%, markedly lower than the 0.10% to 1.21% at
issue in Renfro . Mot. at 11-12. The plan offered 17 investment options
with fees lower than the lowest fees in Renfro (0.10%) and only one plan
above 0.57%. Mot. at 12. With such low fees, it is not inevitable to say that
recordkeeping fees were unnecessarily high, especially when there are
rational bundling reasons to allow separate recordkeepers. Even if there
were cheaper options available for recordkeeping fees, ERISA mandates
that fiduciaries consider options besides cost. Fiduciaries must balance
"providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries" and "defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)
. Without plausibly pleading that these two options were not met, a plaintiff
cannot state a claim for relief.
...
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..

The plan administrators are fiduciaries to every plan member, whether
she invests $10 or $10 million. It is not up to courts to second-guess how
fiduciaries allocate that cost, only that the fiduciary "discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries"
as a whole. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) . To the extent that this argument claims
the arrangement increased fees, it fails on the same reasoning as above:
there are lawful explanations for such an arrangement, and the plaintiffs need
something more than a claim that there may be (or even are) cheaper options
available. The plaintiffs must show that there were no reasonable alternatives
given to plan participants to choose from, which the plaintiffs have not pled.
Cf. Renfro , 671 F.3d at 329 (holding that affording a reasonable mix of
plan options to participants was sufficient to meet the fiduciary standard).
...
..

The plaintiffs next allege that defendants "provided a dizzying array of
duplicative funds in the same investment style" leading to "'decision paralysis'
for participants." Am. Compl. ¶ 132. This assertion is unsupported by the
pleading. The plaintiffs have not alleged any participant who was confused
by the different options, an omission that on its own causes the amended
complaint to fail to state a factual basis for the claim. Moreover, the plan
administrators broke the options down into four categories based on the
participants' investment acumen to help guide them. See generally Mot.
Ex. 6. Offering 78 different choices is not an unreasonably high number,
especially with the tiered descriptive guidance given to participants. As
a practical matter, plan administrators must offer a sufficient amount of
choice to participants, while not overwhelming them to the point participants
cannot actually choose. Providing 78 different investment options satisfies
the "reasonable mix and range of investment options" required by Renfro
without being unduly overwhelming. 671 F.3d at 327 .
...

6

Cited , Quoted

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 131 S. Ct.
1289, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233, 79 U.S.L.W. 4157
(2011)

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 , 678 , 129 S.
Ct. 1937 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must
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be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly ,
550 U.S. at 555 . The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately
prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's
threshold." Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521 , 530 , 131 S. Ct. 1289 ,
179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, assessment of the sufficiency of a complaint is "a context-dependent
exercise" because "[s]ome claims require more factual explication than
others to state a plausible claim for relief." W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys.,
Inc. v. UPMC , 627 F.3d 85 , 98 (3d Cir. 2010).
...

7

Cited , Quoted

W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. Univ.
of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir.
2010)

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 , 678 , 129 S.
Ct. 1937 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly ,
550 U.S. at 555 . The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately
prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's
threshold." Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521 , 530 , 131 S. Ct. 1289 ,
179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, assessment of the sufficiency of a complaint is "a context-dependent
exercise" because "[s]ome claims require more factual explication than
others to state a plausible claim for relief." W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys.,
Inc. v. UPMC , 627 F.3d 85 , 98 (3d Cir. 2010).
...

8

Cited , (See also) ,
Quoted

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223 (3d Cir.
2010)

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain
well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court "must consider only those
facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true."
ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc. , 29 F.3d 855 , 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that courts must "assum[e] that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"); Mayer v.
Belichick , 605 F.3d 223 , 230 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[A] court must consider only
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims
are based upon these documents"). Also, the Court must accept as true all
reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations, and view those facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
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Rocks v. City of Philadelphia , 868 F.2d 644 , 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see also
Revell v. Port Auth. , 598 F.3d 128 , 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
...

9

Cited , (See also)

Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 598 F.3d 128 (3d
Cir. 2010)

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain
well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court "must consider only those
facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true."
ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc. , 29 F.3d 855 , 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that courts must "assum[e] that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"); Mayer v.
Belichick , 605 F.3d 223 , 230 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[A] court must consider only
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims
are based upon these documents"). Also, the Court must accept as true all
reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations, and view those facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Rocks v. City of Philadelphia , 868 F.2d 644 , 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see also
Revell v. Port Auth. , 598 F.3d 128 , 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
...

10

Discussed , (See)

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d
585, 48 EBC 1097 (8th Cir. 2009)

This still allows multiple avenues for plaintiffs to challenge a breach of
fiduciary duty. A plaintiff can allege an inadequate "mix and range of options"
by alleging insufficient choice, that all (or the vast majority of) options breach
the fiduciary duty, an insufficient variety among the range of options, or a
kickback scheme where the fiduciaries directly benefit at the expense of
plan participants. See Renfro , 671 F.3d 314 (insufficient mix and range;
lack of options); Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009)
(assuming insufficient variety among investment vehicles gives rise to a
claim); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009)
(endorsed by the Renfro court for its denial of dismissal due to allegations
of a kickback scheme). At the same time, it effectively discharges Congress'
"careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair" administration "against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41 , 42 , 107 S. Ct. 1549 , 95 L. Ed.
2d 39 (1987).
...

11

Cited , Quoted
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 77 U.S.L.W. 4387
(2009)
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To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 , 678 , 129 S.
Ct. 1937 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly ,
550 U.S. at 555 . The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately
prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's
threshold." Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521 , 530 , 131 S. Ct. 1289 ,
179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, assessment of the sufficiency of a complaint is "a context-dependent
exercise" because "[s]ome claims require more factual explication than
others to state a plausible claim for relief." W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys.,
Inc. v. UPMC , 627 F.3d 85 , 98 (3d Cir. 2010).
...
..

That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount
reality. The Court "need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp.
, 232 F.3d 173 , 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted), and "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678 ; see
also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902 , 906 (3d Cir.
1997) (explaining that a court need not accept a plaintiff's "bald assertions"
or "legal conclusions" (citations omitted)). If a claim "is vulnerable to 12(b)
(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny ,
515 F.3d 224 , 236 (3d Cir. 2008). 5
...

12

Discussed

Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 45
EBC 2761 (7th Cir. 2009)

This still allows multiple avenues for plaintiffs to challenge a breach of
fiduciary duty. A plaintiff can allege an inadequate "mix and range of options"
by alleging insufficient choice, that all (or the vast majority of) options breach
the fiduciary duty, an insufficient variety among the range of options, or a
kickback scheme where the fiduciaries directly benefit at the expense of
plan participants. See Renfro , 671 F.3d 314 (insufficient mix and range;
lack of options); Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009)
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(assuming insufficient variety among investment vehicles gives rise to a
claim); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009)
(endorsed by the Renfro court for its denial of dismissal due to allegations
of a kickback scheme). At the same time, it effectively discharges Congress'
"careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair" administration "against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41 , 42 , 107 S. Ct. 1549 , 95 L. Ed.
2d 39 (1987).
...
..

The plaintiffs' argument that fiduciaries must maintain a myopic focus on the
singular goal of lower fees was soundly rejected in Renfro . 671 F.3d at
327. ERISA requires fiduciaries to balance "providing benefits to participants"
with "defraying reasonable expenses" in the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)
(A) . The plaintiffs here have not pled that these reductions in expenses
could be achieved without changing the variety of benefits to participants.
These same considerations motivated the Seventh Circuit's rejection of
identical "institutional versus retail" arguments. Loomis , 658 F.3d at 671-72
; Hecker , 556 F.3d at 580-81 . Plaintiffs have only pled that the failure to
replace these shares was a breach of fiduciary duty, which is insufficient to
pass through the 12(b)(6) threshold.
...

13

Cited , Quoted

Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d
Cir. 2008)

That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount
reality. The Court "need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp.
, 232 F.3d 173 , 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted), and "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678 ; see
also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902 , 906 (3d Cir.
1997) (explaining that a court need not accept a plaintiff's "bald assertions"
or "legal conclusions" (citations omitted)). If a claim "is vulnerable to 12(b)
(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny ,
515 F.3d 224 , 236 (3d Cir. 2008). 5
...
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14

Discussed , Quoted

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, 2007 ILRC
1829, 23 ILRD 11, 41 CR 567, 75 U.S.L.W.
4337 (2007)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint.
Although Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) , "to 'give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,'" the plaintiff must
provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550
U.S. 544 , 555 , 127 S. Ct. 1955 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation
omitted) (alteration in original).
...
..

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 , 678 , 129 S.
Ct. 1937 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly ,
550 U.S. at 555 . The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately
prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's
threshold." Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521 , 530 , 131 S. Ct. 1289 ,
179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, assessment of the sufficiency of a complaint is "a context-dependent
exercise" because "[s]ome claims require more factual explication than
others to state a plausible claim for relief." W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys.,
Inc. v. UPMC , 627 F.3d 85 , 98 (3d Cir. 2010).
...
..

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain
well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court "must consider only those
facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true."
ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc. , 29 F.3d 855 , 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that courts must "assum[e] that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"); Mayer v.
Belichick , 605 F.3d 223 , 230 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[A] court must consider only
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the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims
are based upon these documents"). Also, the Court must accept as true all
reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations, and view those facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Rocks v. City of Philadelphia , 868 F.2d 644 , 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see also
Revell v. Port Auth. , 598 F.3d 128 , 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
...
..

The plaintiffs' claim that this violates the defendants' fiduciary duty does
not meet the plausibility threshold. As in Twombly , the actions are at least
"just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business
strategy" in the market as they are with a fiduciary breach. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 , 554 , 127 S. Ct. 1955 , 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007). 6
...
..

The argument that TIAA-CREF and Vanguard operated as their own
recordkeepers fails in the face of the same realities discussed above.
Bundling of services is not inconsistent with lawful, free market behavior
in the best interests of those involved, including beneficiaries. Companies,
for example, often "bundle" phone service in with the more popular cable
and internet services, even when the users do not want a land line. In those
instances, it is still a rational self-interested action to purchase the bundle
because the other equipment is worth the price for the consumer, even
with the unnecessary or undesired product or fee. Here, it is rational to
comply with Vanguard's requirement that they serve as recordkeeper if that is
required to gain access to the desired Vanguard portfolio. Just as the actions
in Twombly were "consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with
a wide swath of rational" actions, so too are the actions here—perhaps
consistent with fiduciary breach, but also well in line with a wide swath of
other rational actions. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 554 .
...
..
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Moreover, when examined closely, the plaintiffs' claims do not withstand
scrutiny. A statistical sampling of funds would expect (all things being equal)
half of the funds to be above benchmarks and half to be below benchmarks.
Here, as opposed to what the simplistic statistical average would show,
that 38 (half) of the 76 funds underperformed, the plaintiffs pled that 45
investment options performed below benchmarks. Am. Compl. ¶ 151. Such
a post hoc analysis of market performance, where only 7 more funds
underperformed than would be expected, may be consistent with a breach
of fiduciary duty, but does not show that the plaintiffs have "nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" and "their complaint
must be dismissed." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570 .
...

15

Cited , Quoted

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 124
S. Ct. 2488, 159 L. Ed. 2d 312, 32 EBC 2569,
72 U.S.L.W. 4516 (2004)

ERISA's fiduciary duty standard does not differentiate between § 403(b) and
§ 401(k) plans. Rather, it defines a blanket fiduciary duty standard. ERISA
"aims 'to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans '
in order to ease administrative burdens and reduce employers' costs." Nat'l
Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola , 700 F.3d 65 , 82 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)
(quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila , 542 U.S. 200 , 208 , 124 S. Ct. 2488
, 159 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2004)). Because of the modern-day similarity between
the two retirement plans and the historical roots of ERISA's goal to create a
uniform regulatory system for retirement plans, the analysis of the fiduciary
standards for § 403(b) and § 401(k) retirement plans must be the same. The
Renfro reasoning (and other interpretations of § 401(k) cases) therefore
serve as a guiding light for analyzing the different theories advanced by the
plaintiffs.
...

16

Cited , Quoted

Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp.,
232 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2000)

That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount
reality. The Court "need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp.
, 232 F.3d 173 , 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted), and "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678 ; see
also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902 , 906 (3d Cir.
1997) (explaining that a court need not accept a plaintiff's "bald assertions"
or "legal conclusions" (citations omitted)). If a claim "is vulnerable to 12(b)
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(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny ,
515 F.3d 224 , 236 (3d Cir. 2008). 5
...

17

Discussed , (See
also) , Quoted

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d
902 (3d Cir. 1997)

That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount
reality. The Court "need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp.
, 232 F.3d 173 , 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted), and "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678 ; see
also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902 , 906 (3d Cir.
1997) (explaining that a court need not accept a plaintiff's "bald assertions"
or "legal conclusions" (citations omitted)). If a claim "is vulnerable to 12(b)
(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny ,
515 F.3d 224 , 236 (3d Cir. 2008). 5
...

18

Cited , Quoted

In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig. (Meinhardt v.
Unisys Corp.), 74 F.3d 420, 19 EBC 2393 (3d
Cir. 1996)

"The fiduciary standard is 'flexible, such that the adequacy of a fiduciary's
independent investigation and ultimate investment selection is evaluated
in light of the character and aims of the particular type of plan he serves.'"
Renfro , 671 F.3d at 322 (quoting Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp. (In re Unisys
Sav. Plan Litig .) ( Unisys I ), 74 F.3d 420 , 434 (3d Cir. 1996)). An
ERISA fiduciary acts prudently when it gives "appropriate consideration
to those facts and circumstances that, given the scope of such fiduciary's
investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the . . .
investment course of action involved . . . ." Renfro , 671 F.3d at 322
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i) ). Accordingly, in evaluating a
questioned decision, courts focus upon the fiduciary's "conduct in arriving at
[that] investment decision." Unisys I , 74 F.3d at 434 .
...

19

Cited , Quoted
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Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 19 EBC 1441
(3d Cir. 1995)
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This prohibited transaction requirement in ERISA imposes an additional duty
on fiduciaries not to engage in deals using the plan assets and a "party in
interest." A party in interest is defined as, inter alia , "a person providing
services to such plan" 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B) . The prohibited transactions
provision supplements the "foundational [fiduciary] obligation" by prohibiting
"plan fiduciaries from entering into certain transactions. Subsection (a) erects
a categorical bar to transactions between the plan and a 'party in interest'
deemed likely to injure the plan." Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola , 700 F.3d 65
, 82 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Reich v. Compton , 57 F.3d 270 , 275 (3d
Cir.1995).
...
..

Congress adopted the prohibited transactions provision of ERISA "to prevent
plans from engaging in certain types of transactions that had been used in
the past to benefit other parties at the expense of the plans' participants and
beneficiaries." Reich , 57 F.3d at 275 (quoting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Keystone Consolidated Indus. , 508 U.S. 152 , 160 , 113
S. Ct. 2006 , 124 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1993)). In the decades before ERISA,
plans could "engage in transactions with related parties so long as the
transactions were 'arms-length.' Unfortunately, this rule was difficult to police
and thus 'provided an open door for abuses' by plan trustees." Id. Congress
amended ERISA "with the goal of creating a categorical bar to certain types
of transactions that were regarded as likely to injure a plan." Reich , 57 F.3d
at 275 . 9
...
..

Perhaps Plaintiffs attempt to balance on such an analytical tightrope because
they cite no court that has been persuaded by such a novel argument.
Moreover, the transactions at issue here were not done "to benefit other
parties at the expense of the plans' participants and beneficiaries" but were
simply operating expenses necessary to operate the plan on behalf of the
plan beneficiaries. Reich , 57 F.3d at 275 . While a kickback scheme such
as that in Braden , where the fiduciaries are benefitting by engaging in these
transactions, may be actionable under the prohibited transactions provision,
the plaintiffs must plead that there is a "subjective intent to benefit a party in
interest." Id. at 279. They have not done so here. The plaintiffs' attempts to
shoehorn their fiduciary duty claims into the prohibited transaction provision
simply fail as a matter of law.
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...

20

Cited , Quoted

ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855 (3d Cir.
1994)

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain
well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court "must consider only those
facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true."
ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc. , 29 F.3d 855 , 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that courts must "assum[e] that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"); Mayer v.
Belichick , 605 F.3d 223 , 230 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[A] court must consider only
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims
are based upon these documents"). Also, the Court must accept as true all
reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations, and view those facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Rocks v. City of Philadelphia , 868 F.2d 644 , 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see also
Revell v. Port Auth. , 598 F.3d 128 , 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
...
..

21

Cited , Quoted

PBGC v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d
1192, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 173, 16 EBC 2601
(3d Cir. 1993)

To make it easier for potential investors, plan managers divided the
investment options (which ranged between 76 and 118 options) into four
tiers. Motion to Dismiss ( hereinafter "Mot.") Ex. 6. 4 Tier 1 is for the "do
it for me" investor; tier 2 is geared toward the "help me do it" investor; tier
3 is designed for the "mix my own" investor; and tier 4 is built for the "selfdirected" investor. Mot. Ex. 6. In each of these plans, options are presented
to the beneficiaries from TIAA-CREF and Vanguard, the two companies used
in the Plan. The options range from one option from each company in the
"do it for me" category to complete customization of available options in tier
4. Mot. Ex. 6. Beneficiaries are informed that each mutual fund's prospectus
is available online. Mot. Ex. 3. They are given detailed statistics on each of
the investment options, including 1, 5 and 10 year returns, as well as total
operating expenses. Mot. Ex. 3.
...
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22

Cited , Quoted

Commissioner v. Keystone Consol.
Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 113 S. Ct.
2006, 124 L. Ed. 2d 71, 16 EBC 2121 (1993)

Congress adopted the prohibited transactions provision of ERISA "to prevent
plans from engaging in certain types of transactions that had been used in
the past to benefit other parties at the expense of the plans' participants and
beneficiaries." Reich , 57 F.3d at 275 (quoting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Keystone Consolidated Indus. , 508 U.S. 152 , 160 , 113
S. Ct. 2006 , 124 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1993)). In the decades before ERISA,
plans could "engage in transactions with related parties so long as the
transactions were 'arms-length.' Unfortunately, this rule was difficult to police
and thus 'provided an open door for abuses' by plan trustees." Id. Congress
amended ERISA "with the goal of creating a categorical bar to certain types
of transactions that were regarded as likely to injure a plan." Reich , 57 F.3d
at 275 . 9
...

23

Cited , (See)

Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644
(3d Cir. 1989)

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain
well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court "must consider only those
facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true."
ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc. , 29 F.3d 855 , 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that courts must "assum[e] that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"); Mayer v.
Belichick , 605 F.3d 223 , 230 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[A] court must consider only
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims
are based upon these documents"). Also, the Court must accept as true all
reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations, and view those facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Rocks v. City of Philadelphia , 868 F.2d 644 , 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see also
Revell v. Port Auth. , 598 F.3d 128 , 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
...

24

Cited , Quoted

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
107 S. Ct. 1549, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39, 1 EXC 90, 8
EBC 1409 (1987)

This still allows multiple avenues for plaintiffs to challenge a breach of
fiduciary duty. A plaintiff can allege an inadequate "mix and range of options"
by alleging insufficient choice, that all (or the vast majority of) options breach
the fiduciary duty, an insufficient variety among the range of options, or a
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kickback scheme where the fiduciaries directly benefit at the expense of
plan participants. See Renfro , 671 F.3d 314 (insufficient mix and range;
lack of options); Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009)
(assuming insufficient variety among investment vehicles gives rise to a
claim); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009)
(endorsed by the Renfro court for its denial of dismissal due to allegations
of a kickback scheme). At the same time, it effectively discharges Congress'
"careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair" administration "against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41 , 42 , 107 S. Ct. 1549 , 95 L. Ed.
2d 39 (1987).
...
..

By the 1960s, a national consensus arguably formed that retirement funds
needed comprehensive regulation. Id. at 1-9. As the "inadequacy of current
minimum standards" became apparent, concerns arose that "the soundness
and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits
may be endangered." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) . In response to these concerns,
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to provide a comprehensive mechanism
for regulating nationwide tax-advantaged retirement plans. Employee
Benefits Law at 2-2. "ERISA's detailed provisions set forth a comprehensive
civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for
prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in
encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Pilot Life , 481 U.S.
at 42 .
...

25

Cited , Quoted

Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472
U.S. 559, 105 S. Ct. 2833, 86 L. Ed. 2d 447,
53 U.S.L.W. 4811, 6 EBC 1665 (1985)

The Supreme Court has "often noted that an ERISA fiduciary's duty is
'derived from the common law of trusts.'" Tibble v. Edison Int'l , 135 S.
Ct. 1823 , 1828 , 191 L. Ed. 2d 795 (2015) (quoting Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport Inc.
, 472 U.S. 559 , 570 , 105 S. Ct. 2833 , 86 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1985)). "In
administering the trust the trustee may perform or fail to perform an act that
results in loss to the trust beneficiaries. He is only liable when his conduct
causing the loss failed to conform to the standard of care and skill applicable
to trustees in the administration of trusts." GEORGE BOGERT ET AL, LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541, (3d ed. 2009) (June 2017 Update).
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